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OHIO OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION
LAW-THE FIRST TEN YEARS (1965-1975)
J. RICHARD EMENS* AND JOHN S. LOWE**
I. INTRODUCTION
In view of the energy shortage that this nation faces and of its
particularly heavy impact on the State of Ohio,' it is appropriate to
examine the legal framework within which petroleum energy is pro-
duced in Ohio. A general discussion and critique of Ohio's statutes
was provided by Professors Meyers and Williams in their 1965 article
Petroleum Conservation in Ohio.2 However, the law has continued to
grow and develop during the past ten years, both through legislative
amendment and administrative interpretation. An understanding of
these developments and their implications is essential to the use of
the present law and to the evaluation of proposals for further change.
In considering Ohio's oil and gas conservation law,3 it is helpful
to bear in mind the purposes of a conservation statute. Hydrocarbons
are a depletable natural resource. Conservation statutes are primarily
directed at the avoidance of physical or economic waste of such
resources,' or, to put it postively, the maximization of recovery over
time at the least possible cost.' Therefore, conservation laws are con-
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I The projected figures for curtailment of natural gas to the Ohio distribution companies
for the winter of 1975-76 indicated that the gas companies serving Ohio would have their
natural gas supplies reduced by at least twenty-five percent (except for East Ohio Gas Com-
pany, which was to have been curtailed by five percent). Such curtailment would have resulted
in a projected decrease of natural gas to industries and businesses supplied by the companies
of up to sixty percent. See PUCO Study, Table of Projected Natural Gas Curtailments for Ohio
Winter 1975-76, September 17, 1975. In fact, as this is written, it appears that actual curtail-
ments in the winter of 1975-76 will be less than was anticipated. Ohio's shortfall of both oil
and gas supplies is a continuing one, however, and may be expected to increase in the coming
years. See generally, Ohio Energy Emergency Commission, Ohio Energy Profiles, Vol. I - State
Level Data (July, 1975).
2 Meyers and Williams, Petroleum Conservation in Ohio, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 591 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Meyers & Williams].
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. ch. 1509 (Page Supp. 1974).
A. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 74 (2nd ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS & MEYERS].
5 McDonald, Unit Operation of Oil Reservoirs as an Instrument of Conservation, 49
NOTRE DAME LAW. 305, 309 (1974).
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cerned not only with saving resources, but also with encouraging their
development; rational development is a part of the prevention of
waste. The secondary purpose of an oil and gas conservation statute
is the protection of the private rights of landowners and operators,
which are usually referred to as their correlative rights, i.e. the rights
of those who own the fee interest or the right to drill on land above
oil and gas bearing formations in the common source of supply.6 Thus
the purpose of a conservation statute is both to further the public's
interest in conservation and to protect the property rights of opera-
tors and landowners. Although private rights and the public interest
usually coincide in the long run (since both the public and private
entities have a stake in development), that is often not the case in the
short run 7 and a proper balance is not easy to attain.
The basic principle underlying private rights in oil and gas is the
rule of capture. Oil and gas can migrate from place to place under-
ground, so that a well drilled on one property may drain oil and gas
from under neighboring land. Courts recognized early the driller's
right to capture any oil that he might collect in a bore hole drilled
on his property, even if that oil and gas migrated from the property
of another.8 The rule of capture is limited, however, by common law
principles that seek to mitigate its impact on others who share those
private rights, and by statutory devices such as spacing rules9 and
unitization procedures, 10 which seek to maximize the ultimate pro-
duction of hydrocarbons and minimize the expense of such produc-
tion.11 The impact of these statutory provisions is limited, in turn, by
other statutory procedures, such as exception tract12 and mandatory
pooling orders, 13 which protect private rights. Thus a conservation
statute is a series of balancing provisions, whose purpose is to main-
tain the precarious equilibrium between public interest and private
right.
' There are two aspects of correlative rights: (1) the right of the landowner or leaseholder
to capture such oil or gas as he is able and (2) the right of the landowner or leaseholder to be
protected against damage to the common source of supply and to obtain a fair share of such
supply. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, note 4 supra, at 80-81.
1 In the short run, the individual owner may see his self-interest in obtaining as much
production as quickly as possible. There may thus be waste of hydrocarbons or economic waste
through unnecessary wells being drilled.
Kelley v. The Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N.E. 399 (1897).
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.24 (Page Supp. 1974).
,o See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.26 (Page Supp. 1974).
" See discussion at Shank, Present Status of the Law of Capture, 6th Annual Institute in
Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, Southwestern Legal Foundation 257 (1955).
'2 See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.29 (Page Supp. 1974).
11 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (Page Supp. 1974).
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The developments under Ohio's conservation law in the past ten
years have been consistent with its goals. This article will outline
those developments by reviewing the amendments and interpretations
that have transpired in view of those goals.
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. Pre-Morrow County Legislation
Ohio was one of the first states in which oil exploration and
production operations were conducted, but little was done by the state
in terms of conservation legislation until the enactment of the 1965
statute. Oil was first discovered in Ohio in 1814 during the course of
drilling operations aimed at producing brine.14 Prospecting for oil in
Ohio began in the spring of 1860 in Washington County near Macks-
burg. 5 In 1860 Ohio became the second state of the Union (after
Pennsylvania) to record significant oil production. 6 By 1896, Ohio
was the nation's leading producer, with an annual production of
nearly 24 million barrels, or approximately forty percent of the oil
produced in the United States. 7 During the next sixty-five years,
however, Ohio's oil production declined sharply both in total produc-
tion and in relation to the production of other states. 8
During the 1930's and 1940's several oil and gas producing states
adopted comprehensive conservation statutes which recognized the
development of modern techniques of waste prevention. Ohio,
however, had only the most rudimentary conservation legislation
prior to 1965.1" The oil and gas laws enacted by the Ohio legislature
were principally safety measures to protect coal mines located near
" OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, OIL & GAS LAW IN OHIO, 63 Staff Research
Report 12 (1965) [hereinafter cited as OIL & GAS LAW IN OHIO].
15 Id.
' Id.
' In 1896 Ohio produced 23.9 million barrels of crude petroleum (I. BOWNOCKER, GEO-
LOGICAL SURVEY OF OHIO 53, (1903)), which amounted to thirty-nine percent of the total
United States annual production of 61 million barrels. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957 360-61 (1960).
11 By 1912, Ohio's contribution had rapidly declined to approximately 9 million barrels.
R. ALKIRE, OHIO DIVISION OF GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, R. 1, no. 8, at 44, (1951). This was four
percent of the national total, id. at 360. Ohio's annual crude oil production eventually levelled
off at approximately 3.2 million barrels in 1950, id. at 44, or 16% of an increasing 1,973.6
million barrel national total, id. at p. 360.
11 See generally the discussion of Ohio legislation in B. MURPHY, CONSERVATION OF OIL
AND GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY, 1948, 359-68 (1948); R. HARDWICKE, CONSERVATION OF OIL
AND GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY, 182-85 (Sullivan ed. 1958).
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oil and gas operations, and were administered by the state's inspector
of mines."0
The inaction of the Ohio legislature probably stemmed from the
relative insignificance of Ohio's production of hydrocarbons after
1910.1 About the middle of the century, however, oil production
began to increase once again, although gas production continued to
decline. As a result, the legislative framework was expanded some-
what, 23 but as late as 1958 one commentator asserted that:
"[c]onservation of oil and gas in Ohio has been a myth. Inadequacies
in the earlier laws, many of which remain uncorrected and a disregard
for current problems because production is insignificant, pose grave
dangers for the immediate future. 24
Ohio's problems were exacerbated in 1963 when the "Morrow
County boom" began with the discovery of oil in the Trempeleau
Formation near Mt. Gilead in Morrow County. The extent of this oil
and gas activity is indicated by the following quotation from the Ohio
Legislative Service Commission's report published in 1965:
Production in Ohio has risen from about 14,000 barrels a day early
in 1961 to between 40,000 and 50,000 barrels a day at present.
Production in Morrow County alone has risen from 1,100 barrels
of oil per day in February 1963 to a present daily recovery of
between 30,000 and 40,000 barrels. From February 1963 to March
1964 the number of producing wells in Morrow County went from
17 to 146; the known oil reserves in the ground increased from 2.2
million barrels of oil to 20 million; there were over 200 wells drilled
in the county. It is said that over three-fourths of Ohio has been
leased for oil and gas . . . Because of such increased activity,
Ohio is the hottest subject in the oil industry.2
' OIL & GAS LAW IN OHIO, note 14 supra, at 15-18.
21 See MURPHY, note 19 supra, at 368.
22 During the years 1951 to 1959 average oil production in Ohio was approximately
3,300,000 barrels of oil annually. By 1959 to 1961, average annual oil production in the state
had increased to nearly 5,700,000 barrels. See Table, "History of Production Statistics", in
INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, A STUDY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 130 (1964).
2 The provisions of the statutes relating to well logs, plugging and flooding were spelled
out in detail in Act of May 22, 1951, 124 Ohio Laws 253. With the revised code in 1953, the
gas and oil laws were segregated from the chapter of mining laws into a new chapter 4159,
which was entitled "Wells-Oil; Gas." In 1957, an amendment to § 4159.12 of the Ohio Revised
Code was adopted to provide that the cost of plugging wells abandoned prior to September 1,
1951, could be provided out of county funds. Act of May 20, 1957, 127 Ohio Laws 254. That
same year, OHIO REV. CODE chapter 4161 was enacted to regulate the underground storage of
gas. Act of May 21, 1957, 127 Ohio Laws 177.
24 See HARDWICKE note 19 supra, at 184.
21 See OIL & GAS LAW IN OHIO, note 14 supra, at 13.
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The Morrow County boom focused the public's attention on the
inadequacies of the Ohio conservation law and resulted in 1963 in the
adoption of a "vague one-paragraph law [that] authorized the Divi-
sion of Mines to regulate drilling in an unspecified manner." 2 The
new statute did not repeal any of the then existing laws relating to
oil and gas, but simply gave the Division of Mines the additional
regulatory power to "make, publish, and enforce rules and regula-
tions governing the issuance of permits for and the drilling of wells
for the production of oil and gas and the operation thereof. '27 Under
the authority of that legislation, emergency rules were issued early in
1964 .2 The 1963 act and the emergency rules were widely regarded
as a stop-gap effort, however.29 "The state's high level of activity in
oil and gas production was unexpected by generations of Ohio law-
makers, and thus present laws do not provide adequate administra-
tive supervision for safety and conservation of these minerals. '3
B. The 1965 Act
Even before the 1963 legislation was enacted, the work that
ultimately resulted in the 1965 oil and gas conservation law had
begun. Efforts to formulate a comprehensive approach to the prob-
lems made apparent by the situation in Morrow County were begun
in late 1963 and continued throughout 1964 and into 1965. The chief
proponents of the comprehensive approach were the members of the
Interim Joint Legislative Study Committee of the legislature and the
Conservation and Legislative Committee of the Ohio Oil and Gas
Association, but many others participated. Amended House Bill No.
234 3 transferred the function of administering oil and gas legislation
from the Division of Mines in the Department of Industrial Relations
to the newly created Division of Oil and Gas in the Department of
Natural Resources. The act also created the position of Chief of the
Division of Oil and Gas and granted the Chief powers to administer
the act and to adopt rules and regulations in accordance with the
provisions of the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act.32
26 OIL AND GAS J., Feb. 24, 1964, at 57 (referring to Act of Dec. 6, 1963, 130 Ohio Laws
1568).
21 Act of Dec. 6, 1963, 130 Ohio Laws 982 (repealed 1965).
Effective March 10, 1964.
n See text accompanying note 26 supra and McDonald, note 5 supra, at 19-20.
31 See OIL & GAS LAW IN OHIO, note 14 supra, at 15.
32 Act of July 6, 1965, 131 Ohio Laws 1736 (effective Oct. 10, 1965).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1509.02 and 1509.03 (Page Supp. 1974).
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Review authority was deposited in a five member Oil and Gas
Board of Review empowered to hear appeals from persons claiming
to be aggrieved or adversely affected by an order of the Chief of the
Division of Oil and Gas." The Board was given not only the power
to overrule orders of the Chief which it found to be "unreasonable
or unlawful," but was also authorized to make the "order which it
finds the Chief should have made. 3 Appeals from decisions of the
Board were to be to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin
County.35
Technical assistance to the Chief was provided by a seven mem-
ber Technical Advisory Council, composed of three members repre-
senting independent oil and gas operators, three members represent-
ing oil and gas operators having substantial producing operations
both in Ohio and at least one other state, and one public member.
Although the Chief of the Division was not required to consult with
the Technical Advisory Council prior to promulgation of regula-
tions, 37 the intent of the statute was to encourage the administrator
to avail himself of the opinion and expertise of the Council.
The law also provided a number of devices to protect the correla-
tive rights38 of mineral owners. Voluntary pooling was specifically
permitted. 9 The statute also provided that the Chief might, upon
application by the owner, order the mandatory pooling of adjoining
tracts in order to protect the interests of one or more of the owners,
if voluntary arrangements could not be negotiated." Special provi-
sion was made to permit owners who were unable to join existing
adjacent drilling units and whose tracts were too small to meet the
standards set for minimum spacing requirements to drill on those
tracts, with limitation of production based on acreage and well poten-
tial."
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.35 (Page Supp. 1974).
"4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.36 (Page Supp. 1974).
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.37 (Page Supp. 1974).
36 131 Ohio Laws 485, as amended, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.38 (Page Supp. 1974).
31 Exceptions are rules and regulations setting or varying minimum average requirements
for drilling units and minimum distance requirements between wells, which §§ 1509.24 and
1509.25 require to be approved by the Technical Advisory Council.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.01(I) (Page Supp. 1974) defines correlative rights as "the
reasonable opportunity to every person entitled thereto to recover and receive the oil and gas
in and under his tract or tracts, or the equivalent thereof, without having to drill unnecessary
wells or incur other unnecessary expense."
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.26 (Page Supp. 1974).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (Page Supp. 1974).
4 Id.
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But the primary thrust of the new statutory provisions was to-
ward the prevention of physical and economic waste. The act author-
ized the Chief, with the consent of the Technical Advisory Council,
to set minimum spacing requirements for drilling in order to control
the number of wells which might be drilled on adjoining tracts to
drain the oil and gas from under a given area. 2 Mandatory pooling
was authorized to prevent waste as well as to protect correlative
rights.13 Unitization was authorized if the Chief found "that such
operation is reasonably necessary to increase substantially the ulti-
mate recovery of oil and gas . . ." subject to approval of a required
percentage of mineral and royalty owners." The act specifically re-
quired the use of "every reasonable precaution in accordance with the
most approved methods of operation to stop and prevent waste of oil
or gas, or both. '45
The statutory provisions imposing requirements upon oil and gas
operators were substantially expanded and broadened. Permits were
required to drill, reopen or plug back wells. 6 Many of the provisions
of the prior legislation relating to the safety aspects of the production
of oil and gas in the coal bearing areas were also incorporated into
the new legislation.47 Continuity was further insured by the act's pro-
vision that the rules, regulations, and orders of the Division of Mines
concerning oil and gas production and oil field waste disposal that
had been adopted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure
Act under the earlier legislation would be valid rules, regulations and
orders of the Division of Oil and Gas.4
Meyers and Williams, in their 1965 article, were generally com-
plimentary of the achievements of the legislature in enacting the new
legislation. 9 They concluded, however, that the statute failed to pro-
vide complete enough authority to the Chief to achieve maximum
conservation, that it failed to provide fully for the protection of cor-
relative rights, and that administration could have been made simpler
and more effective. They listed several substantive rules which de-
parted from sound conservation practice, and noted a number of
42 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.24 (Page Supp. 1974).
'" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (Page Supp. 1974).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.28 (Page Supp. 1974).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.20 (Page Supp. 1974).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.05 (Page Supp. 1974).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1509.08, 1509.18, 1509.19 (Page Supp. 1974).
" Act of July 6, 1965, 131 Ohio Laws 1736, § 3.
" Meyers & Williams, note 2 supra, at 591.
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ambiguities that they predicted would produce uncertainty in
administration and unnecessary litigation. Meyers and Williams'
observations and criticisms provide a useful framework for examin-
ing the development of Ohio's oil and gas law since 1965.
C. Amendments to the Statute
There have been seven substantive amendments to chapter 1509
over the past decade.-" These amendments to the Ohio oil and gas law
may be grouped roughly into two classes, both in terms of the image
that they reflect of the oil and gas law and in terms of chronology.
The first three amendments to the statute, adopted in 1967, can be
characterized as pro-industry, being apparently aimed at removing
ambiguities in the statute or at making it easier for operators to do
business in compliance with the law. The last four amendments, en-
acted from 1972 through 1974, appear to be anti-industry, demon-
strating a view of the oil and gas industry as an entity to be regulated
and controlled, or at least as a force against which the people and
the environment of the state must be protected.
The oil and gas statute was first amended in 1967 by a provision
in House Bill 93,1 which was aimed at increasing the compensation
to be paid to members of the Oil and Gas Board of Review. In their
review of the statute in 1965, Meyers and Williams cited the "nig-
gardly limit of $20 a day . . .",5 which was the compensation pro-
vided for in the original statute," as a factor that made the Board
not as "likely to have the constructive influence on the conservation
regime that such an institution might have. The Board may turn out
to be another example of a good idea killed by parsimony."54 House
Bill 93 took a step toward correcting this parsimony by providing that
members of the Board of Review should be paid an amount per diem
when serving equal to that paid to other public members of boards
in Ohio.55
" In addition, there have been various "clerical" amendments correcting punctuation,
misspellings, etc., which will not be considered here.
11 Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.35 (Page Supp. 1974).
52 Meyers & Williams, note 2 supra, at 593.
13 Act of July 6, 1965, 131 Ohio Laws 481, as amended, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.35
(Page Supp. 1974).
51 Meyers & Williams, note 2 supra at 634.
13 Specifically, the statute provided that members should be paid an amount per diem
"fixed pursuant to § 143.09 of the Revised Code. ... This is the section which sets salary
ranges for public employees, as amended, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.14 (Page Supp. 1974).
The current rate for members is $7.72 per hour per day worked. However, the compensation
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The second amendment in 1967 dealt with underground liquid
disposal. Amended Senate Bill 22656 added §§ 1509.051 and 1509.081,
which provided for the issuance and regulation of liquid disposal
permits by the Division of Oil and Gas. In addition, § 1509.01, the
definition section, was amended by the modification of the definition
of the term "well" as used in the statute to include wells for "sewage,
and any liquid used in or resulting from any process or industry,
manufacture, trade, business or agriculture. '57 Wells may not be used
for liquid disposal unless a permit for that use is obtained from the
Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas.58 The application for a liquid
disposal permit contains information similar to that required for a
permit to drill a well, but the application must be approved by the
Division of Geological Survey, the Division of Water, the Depart-
ment of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as
the Division of Oil and Gas and, if the well is located in a coal
producing township, the Division of Mines.59 These sections, with
their multiple approval requirements, were enacted at the behest of
heavy manufacturing industries to clarify the authority of the Divi-
sion of Oil and Gas to allow underground disposal of pollutants under
controlled circumstances."
The most important and extensive of the industry oriented
amendments, however, was Amended Substitute House Bill 310
[hereinafter called House Bill 310].1 This amendment resulted from
a review of chapter 1509 by the Ohio Bar Association's Committee
level has proved to be of little significance; at least until the beginning of 1975, no Board
member ever claimed the compensation provided.
Act of June 20, 1967, 132 Ohio Laws 2229.
" OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.01(A) (Page Supp. 1974).
S OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.051 (Page Supp. 1974).
" Oflo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.081 (Page Supp. 1974).
" In fact, however, the amendment has not altogether clarified the situation. In Ohio
Liquid Disposal, Inc. v. Dawe, Case No. 691 (May 16, 1975), Ohio's sixth appellate district
upheld a lower court order to the Chief of the Division to issue a disposal well permit which
had been approved by all the required agencies but the Water Pollution Control Board (whose
functions were subsequently transferred to the Environmental Protection Agency), holding that
the board had no basis in law or fact to determine that the proposed injection would pollute
the "waters of the state" as defined in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6111.01 (H) (Page 1954) because
the deep well injection zone was not included in that definition. The Environmental Protection
Agency appealed the decision of the court of appeals to the supreme court, which refused to
hear the case (Case No. 75-692, motion to certify overruled on October 24, 1975). Shortly
thereafter, a bill was introduced in the Ohio Senate that would effectively overturn by legislative
action the decision on the Ohio Liquid Disposal case. S.B. 404, 11 Ith Gen. Ass'm., 1st Sess.
[19751.
62 Act of Aug. 21, 967, 132 Ohio Laws 2579.
40 37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 31 (1976)
on Oil and Gas Law."2 It is apparent from the matters treated in the
amendments that the committee, and perhaps many of the legislators,
had considered the criticisms and suggestions made by Meyers and
Williams in their 1965 article.
One of the criticisms leveled by Meyers and Williams against the
Ohio statute was that the provisions of § 1509.27 relating to manda-
tory pooling orders did not give the Chief of the Division enough
discretion.63 That section provided that an owner of land who was
unable to negotiate voluntary pooling agreements with the owners or
operators of adjacent properties and whose own tract did not meet
the size or shape requirements for a drilling permit might apply to
the division for a mandatory pooling order. If the order were granted
by the Chief, two questions arose: first, how were the costs to be
shared by the owners or operators of the leases included in the drilling
unit thus created; and second, what would happen if one objected to
putting up his share of the drilling costs for a well which he expected
would not be commercially productive? The statute originally pro-
vided that a nonconsenting owner or operator would not be entitled
to share in the proceeds of the production of such a well until the
other operators had recouped two hundred percent of his share of
the cost from the recalcitrant's leasehold interest. Meyers and Wil-
liams found this approach too inflexible and questioned its constitu-
tional validity. They urged that the Chief be given discretion to make
the penalty less than two hundred percent64 and that the recalcitrant
operator be given the option of transferring his leases to the unit
operator upon terms set by the Chief.6 5
Without an explanation of their choice, both the Bar Association
committee6 and the legislature accepted only part of Meyers' and
Williams' suggestion. Section 1509.27 was amended to give the Chief
discretion to determine the percentage of the "penalty" of drilling
costs that would be levied against the nonconsenting operator, with
a maximum limit of two hundred percent. 7 While not meeting both
of Meyers and Williams' specifications, the amendment does provide
some flexibility and would seem to be sufficient to remove all serious
constitutional questions. 6
62 REPORT OF THE OIL & GAS LAW COMMITTEE, 39 OHIO BAR 1225 (1966).
s Meyers & Williams, note 2 supra, at 604-12.
Id. at 638.
SId.
II See note 62 supra, at 1228.
'7 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (Page Supp. 1974).
" Meyers and Williams contended that the rigid two hundred percent penalty might be
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Meyers and Williams also raised questions as to the effect of the
mandatory pooling and unitization sections of the oil and gas law 9
upon the unpooled or ununitized portion of a tract of land covered
by a pooled or unitized lease." They urged that the portion of a lease
not included in the pool or unit should be split off so that operations
or production on a portion of the pooled or unitized property would
be attributed only to the acreage included in the pool or unit. Whether
or not the lease would be preserved on the excluded acreage of the
lease would depend upon the conduct of operations and the securing
of production upon that portion of the property. Meyers and Wil-
liams argued that to interpret the statute otherwise-and they recog-
nized that the language was somewhat ambiguous-would be unfair
to the lessors, for it would tie up the excluded land without their
consent and without any gain to them or the public. Again, the Com-
mittee on Oil and Gas Law and the legislature did not accept Meyers
and Williams' suggestion. The committee report noted that:
As a matter of policy our committee was of the opinion that the
excluded portion of a lease should be subject to the well settled laws
of implied covenants. It was also the belief of our Committee that
the drafters intended this result. The amendment preserves to a
landowner or lessor the right to go into court and demand relief for
failure to adequately develop oil and gas resources under all of his
lands.7"
Accordingly, §§ 1509.27 and 1509.28 were amended to provide specif-
ically that drilling upon or operating or producing upon any portion
of pooled or unitized tracts would be considered to be operations
upon a lease "any portion of which is included" in the drilling unit
or unitized area.72
Although the landowners' position presented by Meyers and
Williams has merit, the Oil and Gas Committee's argument is just
as compelling. The scheme of § 1509.27 and § 1509.28 is no more
subject to the constitutional attack of arbitrariness. Note 63 supra, at 609-12. The amendment
to § 1509.27 gives the Chief flexibility in determining the penalty and should defeat an attack
on the basis of arbitrariness.
11 Ohio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1509.27 and 1509.28 (Page Supp. 1974).
70 Meyers and Williams, note 2 supra, at 623-28.
7T See note 62 supra, at 1229. The landowner's right stems from the covenant of reasonable
development, an implied duty in an oil and gas lease obligating the lessee to use due diligence
to reasonably develop the leased property after the discovery of oil or gas in the area. See Harris
v. The Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502 (1897).
71 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.27, last paragraph, and § 1509.28, fourth from last
paragraph (Page Supp. 1974).
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unfair or unsound than the scheme of most oil and gas leases, which
provide that production on any part of the leased premises will per-
petuate the lease on the entire acreage, subject to the implied cove-
nant to reasonably develop. Further, the 1967 amendment has sim-
plicity and certainty to recommend it.
Meyers and Williams, however, argued in 1965 that the scheme
of the amendment ultimately adopted in 1967 would be violative of
due process, since royalty owners do not have the opportunity under
the statute to be heard on the contents of the order or its promulga-
tion. The thrust of this argument is that if the state is to be empow-
ered to satisfy the habendum clause of an oil and gas lease by admin-
istrative fiat, the lessor must have the right to be heard prior to the
decision. 3 Its force depends upon the interpretation given the phrase
"owners of land" as used in the second paragraph of § 1509.27. This
paragraph requires that, prior to issuing a mandatory pooling order,
the Chief must "notify all owners of land within the area proposed
to be included within the order . . . of their right to a hearing
. . 'i" Generally, in chapter 1509 the term "owner" means the
operator, "the person who has the right to drill on a tract" under
an oil and gas lease.15 However, the term "owner" is seldom used
in chapter 1509 in conjunction with the modifying phrase "of land."
The phrase "owners of land" therefore, apparently refers to the
landowner, who in Ohio is almost always the royalty owner, rather
than to the operator. Thus, royalty owners are given ail opportu-
nity to be heard. The flow in this reasoning is that the royalty owner
is not always the same person as the landowner. Nonetheless, the
interpretation suggested has been the one followed by the Division of
Oil and Gas; the problem that would be raised if the royalty interest
and the fee interest in the land had been severed has not yet had to
be faced.
House Bill 310 also made three changes in the provisions of
§ 1509.07, which required the posting of a surety bond in order to
guarantee the proper plugging of abandoned wells. First, the section
was amended to provide that the surety bond required was condi-
tioned on compliance with the plugging requirements and permit
provisions of the law rather than on compliance with all the various
and sometimes technical requirements of Chapter 1509.11 This
71 Meyers and Williams note 2 supra, at 627.
11 Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (Page Supp. 1974),
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.01(K) (Page Supp. 1974).
"' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.07 (Page Supp. 1974),formerly 131 Ohio Laws 463.
-OIL AND GAS
amendment was prompted by the difficulty encountered by some
operators in obtaining the required surety bond from insurance car-
riers. Some bonding companies had interpreted the section to mean
that the bond guaranteed compliance with all of the provisions of the
oil and gas law. The rationale of the amendment was that the scope
of the surety bond was intended to be narrow, that "the intention of
the original drafters was to require a bond principally to insure
against unscrupulous operators drilling wells and leaving the state
without properly plugging such wells thereby endangering fresh water
supplies."" Thus the risk to the operator that a technical, nonma-
terial violation of the law might be construed as requiring the forfei-
ture of a substantial bond was removed. The bill as finally enacted
added a new section, § 1509.071, to specify the procedures to be
followed upon forfeiture of a bond. This section established an oil and
gas well plugging fund, into which forfeited amounts from bonds were
to be paid, and from which funds could be expended by the division
to plug wells on which bonds had been forfeited." Second, § 1509.07
was amended by the addition of a paragraph empowering the Chief
of the Division of Oil and Gas to accept proof of financial responsibil-
ity in lieu of a surety bond. 9 This amendment was not proposed by
the Bar Association committee, but by representatives of industry
who believed that the surety bond requirement was often an unneces-
sary expense. The exercise of this power was discretionary; "[i]n lieu
of such bond, the chief may ,accept proof of financial responsibil-
ity. .. ."" The limits of this discretion were stated only in very
general terms." In practice, the power given the Chief has proved to
be an administrative headache and is now rarely invoked. Third,
§ 1509.07 was amended by deleting the authority originally given the
Chief to order the suspension of operations or the plugging of the well
if he considered the original surety bond filed to be inadequate
and the operator failed to post a new one within thirty days."2
" See note 62 supra, at 1227.
'7 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.071 (Page Supp. 1974).
"' OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.07 (Page Supp. 1974),formerly 131 Ohio Laws 463.
Id.
"[A] net financial worth within this state equal to twice the amount of the bond for
which it substitutes and, as may be required by the chief a list of producing properties of the
owner within this state or such other evidence showing ability and intent to comply with the
law .. " Id.
12 131 Ohio Laws 463, penultimate paragraph, as amended, OHio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1509.07 (Page Supp. 1974).
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House Bill 310 also broadened the discretion of the Chief of the
Division in ordering wells plugged pursuant to § 1509.12.83 The stat-
ute originally provided that wells might not stand idle for more than
six months and required that gas wells that had ceased to be produc-
tive and that had not been operated for a period of six months should
be plugged. Meyers and Williams observed that this established "an
absolute statutory duty of operation as a substitute . ..for the
common-law duty of prudent operation."84 The amendment dis-
pensed with the arbitrary time limit by striking the references to the
six month period. Whether this change constituted an acceptance of
the common law doctrine of prudent operation became an issue in
subsequent hearings before the Oil and Gas Board of Review, as will
be seen below.85
Finally, House Bill 310 modified § 1509.36, which deals with
appeals to the Oil and Gas Board of Review, to permit any "inter-
ested person" to submit evidence to the Board at hearings." This
amendment was in response to the question, which had already arisen
in hearings before the Board, whether landowners or operators of
tracts adjacent to those involved in the hearing were entitled to partic-
ipate in the hearing. Often, such persons have interests-or think they
have-that may be vitally affected by decisions of the Board.
No further amendments to the oil and gas law were adopted for
nearly five years. During that time, the interest of Ohio's legislators
in oil and gas law turned from resolving ambiguities and making it
simpler to do business under the statute toward protecting the public
and the environment from the industry.
In 1972, Amended Substitute Senate Bill 38787 added two
provisions aimed at protecting the interests of royalty owners, who,
in Ohio, are usually the farmers upon whose land wells are drilled.
Section 1509.30 states that the holder of a royalty interest in any
natural gas well has the right to require the operator to report to him
on an ongoing basis information relevant to the amount of royalty
due.88 Section 1509.31 requires that the royalty interest owner be in-
formed of the name and address of any transferee of an oil and gas
lease within thirty days of the transfer. If the lease has been develop-
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.12 (Page Supp. 1974), formerly 31 Ohio Laws 467.
Meyers and Williams, note 2 supra, at 596.
See text accompanying notes 185-207 infra.
88 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.36 (Page Supp. 1974).
Act of April 4, 1972, 134 Ohio Laws 657.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.30 (Page Supp. 1974).
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ed, i.e. if there are wells on it, the notification requirement is extended
to include the Division of Oil and Gas.
89
Aside from the requirement of notification to the Division of Oil
and Gas, which assists the Division in compiling information on the
development of hydrocarbon resources in the state, this statutory
amendment may seem unnecessary. Production information was al-
ready available to royalty owners from the gas companies that pur-
chased the gas produced, and information relating to transfers of
ownership should have been available from the records of the var-
ious county recorders. Furthermore, one would expect that the
good business judgment of the operators would have made produc-
tion and ownership information available to royalty owners simply
as a matter of good business practice. This analysis, however, ignores
the economic developments of the late 1960's and early 1970's. Dur-
ing that period of time, artificially low prices for hydrocarbons and
rising costs of production undercut the profitability of the Ohio petro-
leum industry to such an extent that the tax shelter aspects of drilling
ventures became the primary justification of much of the Ohio
industry. Some operators initially attracted to Ohio by the Morrow
County activity of the mid-1960's remained, marketing their drilling
ventures on the basis of the high completion percentages of Clinton
wells and the tax advantages offered to the investor rather than on
the basis of returns on investment from the hydrocarbons produced.
Because the emphasis of such operators was on sales promotion
rather than production, a small but highly visible minority failed to
maintain good relations with their royalty owners. Royalty owners
made their dissatisfaction known to the legislature, and Amended
Substitute Senate Bill 387 was the result.8 9-1
The interests of royalty owners in oil and gas operations were
further recognized in 1972 by enactment of Amended Senate Bill
425, 90 which expanded the membership of the Technical Advisory
Council created by § 1509.38 to include a member representing roy-
alty interest holders." Although the amendment did not specifically
so state, it was apparently intended that the royalty interest owner
"' Orio REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.31 (Page Supp. 1974).
81-1 § 1509.30 is limited to gas wells because historically purchasers of oil have often made
payment directly to the landowners in wells from which the production is purchased, while the
gas companies have preferred to deal directly with operators, paying them for gas delivered
and leaving it to them to remit to the interest owners, including royalty interest owners.
10 Act of May 9, 1972, 134 Ohio Laws 832.
'" OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.38 (Page Supp. 1974). See text accompanying note 36
supra.
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representative also be a landowner; this is appropriate, since there are
few severed oil and gas mineral rights in Ohio.
Legislative concern with the interests of landowners, whether or
not they owned royalty interests, again appeared two years later in
the adoption of House Bill 216.92 A new provision imposed two re-
quirements for restoration of drilled land by Ohio oil and gas opera-
tors. Within six months after a well is completed, the operator must
remove all structures and excavations that are not necessary for the
operation of the weltand restore the surface of the land disturbed by
the drilling process. 3 Further, within six months after the plugging
of an abandoned well or a dry hole, all structures and excavations
must be removed and the land restored. 4 Performance of these obli-
gations is guaranteed by the extension of the terms of the surety bond
required by § 1509.07. The operator may be relieved of the obligation
to restore if the landowner requests that the requirements be waived.
Such requests must be submitted to the Chief of the Division of Oil
and Gas, who is required to approve them unless he finds that the
waiver would be likely to have detrimental effects upon the adjoining
property or upon the interests of the state in preventing pollution or
erosion.95
The restoration section of the statute was the product of an
election year in which legislators of both major parties from oil and
gas producing areas were attempting to demonstrate their concern for
their landowner constituents. It cannot, however, be denied that the
legislature responded to a real problem. Most oil and gas leases used
in Ohio do not contain clauses obligating the operator to clean up and
restore the premises either upon completion of the well or upon aban-
donment. The legal rights of the landowner at common law are rather
ill defined96 and, as a practical matter, difficult to enforce; damages
suffered by the landowner seldom exceed a few hundred dollars, so
that the cost of a suit on a nuisance or negligence theory, even if
successful, might very well exceed the ultimate recovery. Most opera-
"5 Act of April 14, 1972, 134 Ohio Laws 655.
'" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.072(A) (Page Supp. 1974).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.072(B) (Page Supp. 1974).
:5 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1509.072 (Page Supp. 1974).
' The common law restoration remedies that a landowner has available are basically an
excessive use of a surface easement, nuisance, and negligence; the reported cases are few and
contradictory, usually being decided on their facts. See, generally A. WILLIAMS AND C. MEY-
ERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, §§ 218.8-.12 (1972); Annot. 65 A.L.R. 2d 1356 (1959). It has also been
proposed that there should be an implied obligation of restoration in oil and gas leases. See
Smith v. Schuster, 66 So. 2d 430 (Ct. App. La. 1933): Note, 25 OKLA L. REV. 572 (1972).
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tors, in the interest of good business relations, took restoration mea-
sures similar to those now required by statute, but the ever-present
and highly visible minority did not.
House Bill 216 also modified the bonding requirements of
§ 1509.07 to permit a deposit with the Division of Oil and Gas of cash
or a certificate of deposit in lieu of the posting of a plugging and
restoration bond." Formerly, the Chief could not accept cash in place
of a bond, and if he refused to accept a financial statement in lieu of
a bond, the operator was usually required to deposit the cash with
an insurance company and pay an annual bonding fee to the insurer,
after which the company would issue the bond required by the statute.
No one was happy with this arrangement, and the 1974 legislation
removed a small but sticky piece of red tape from the Ohio law
relating to oil and gas.
The restoration section of House Bill 216 is a noteworthy devel-
opment in the oil and gas law of Ohio for at least two reasons. First,
it clearly recognizes the interest of the state in restoration and
cleanup, even when the damage caused to the environment does not
amount to a legal nuisance or violate the regulations of the Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency or similar agencies. Under
§ 1509.072 the operator must, as a practical matter, satisfy both the
landowner and the Division of Oil and Gas that his restoration efforts
are adequate. Second, the new section reverses the common law and
imposes broad, sweeping obligations on operators. With the excep-
tion of certain federal regulations relating to oil and gas operations
on federally owned lands,9" no other jurisdiction goes so far in requir-
ing restoration."
The legislature's concern for the environmental impact of oil and
gas operations can also be seen in a 1974 amendment relating to the
plugging of orphan wells. Ohio law has, since 1951, required the
posting of a surety bond to guarantee the proper plugging of nonpro-
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.07 (Page Supp. 1974).
"7 For example, those required by Forest Supervisors of the Forest Service of the United
States Department of Agriculture, pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 251.15 (1975), with respect to
operations on lands where mineral rights are reserved to the United States.
" Research has discovered few states with restoration provisions. Illinois and Kansas treat
the failure to restore as a public nuisance and require the lessee to return the land to its prior
condition (as far as it is practicable). ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 100 § 26(12) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. 55-132(a) (1964). In Indiana, any person who enters land to conduct
oil and gas operations is liable for surface damages, to the surface owner, but no punitive
damages may be assessed and the terms of a valid oil and gas lease dealing with such damages
will prevail. IND. STAT. ANN. 46-1802(c) (Burns 1965).
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ducing oil and gas wells. 99-' Prior to that time, however, no means
existed to ensure that wells would be plugged after their productive
lives were over. Wells which have been abandoned without being
properly plugged are termed "orphan" wells, and their precise num-
bers are unknown, although it has been estimated that they number
in the thousands. Such wells present a danger, albeit relatively mini-
mal, to the safety of persons who may work or play around them, to
the purity of underground water supplies, and to the pressure of
nearby oil or gas producing reservoirs. As has been noted, in 1967
an oil and gas well plugging fund was established to which forfeited
surety bonds were to be paid upon failure of operators to comply with
the plugging requirements of the statute.99-2 The Division of Oil and
Gas was empowered to spend the money credited to the fund to plug
the wells for which bonds had been forfeited. No authority was given,
however, to use such funds for the plugging of orphan wells drilled
prior to the establishment of the bonding procedures. Under the stat-
ute, the responsibility for the plugging of those wells might under
some circumstances be imposed upon the landowner upon whose
property they were located.'"' However, enforcement of this obliga-
tion against landowners who may not even have suspected the pres-
ence of abandoned wells upon their property when they purchased it
has never been politically attractive. Amended House Bill 221 took
a hesitant but laudable step toward filling the gap by amending
§ 1509.071 to permit the use of monies from the oil and gas plugging
fund to plug any wells "for which no funds are available . . ..
The bill provided that all fines imposed under the penalty section of
the oil and gas law should be paid to the fund. This is at best a
hesitant step, however, since prosecutions instigated by the Division
of Oil and Gas have never generated sufficient revenues to accomplish
the necessary plugging, and it would be unreasonable to expect that
they will.10 2
D. Legislative Summary
Meyers and Williams concluded in their 1965 article that the
Ohio oil and gas statute provided "the authority and means to accom-
99.1 124 Ohio Laws 260 (effective September 7, 1951).
99.2 See discussion in text accompanying note 78 supra.
'00 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3617.13, 3617.24 (Page 1971).
191 Olo REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.71 (Page Supp. 1974).
102 As of January 1, 1975, the oil and gas well plugging fund carried a balance of approxi-
mately $2,300, an amount that could easily be expended to properly plug only one well.
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plish effective petroleum conservation."'6 3 In considering the legisla-
tive developments of the last ten years, it is important to remember
that the impetus for the 1965 legislation came from oil and gas opera-
tors who were concerned with the lack of sound conservation practice
that accompanied the Morrow County boom. Since these men
worked closely with the legislature in drafting the statute, it is not
surprising that the resulting enactment made Ohio an attractive place
for oil and gas developers to operate. The 1967 amendments were
also enacted at a time when considerable political importance was
given to making Ohio a good place to do business. In the years since
1972, however, the ground swell of concern for the environment and
distrust of the business community that has arisen across the nation
has shifted the balance of legislative power against the oil and gas
operators. On balance, the latter group of amendments has made it
somewhat harder and less attractive for oil and gas operators to do
business in Ohio. But neither group of legislative changes has sub-
stantially affected the basically sound conservation provisions of the
statute. The assessment of the act as one which provides the "author-
ity and means to accomplish effective petroleum conservation" is as
accurate today as it was a decade ago.
On the other hand, several of the statutory ambiguities and defi-
ciencies noted by Meyers and Williams remain. These problems will
become increasingly important as the energy shortage continues and
are worthy of note here, although they were discussed at length by
Meyers and Williams.
As was noted by Meyers and Williams,0 4 nothing in the statute
or in any of the amendments enacted expressly permits the Chief of
the Division to make rules to prevent waste. In fact, some of the rules
adopted to insure safety also operate to prevent waste," 5 but there
may be need for additional administrative devices-either now or in
the future-to prevent waste, and the authority to create them should
be explicit.
A second problem lies in the statute's failure to permit prora-
tioning to prevent waste.' Historically, prorationing has been used
as a tool to maintain price levels in times when potential supply
"I Meyers and Williams, note 2 supra, at 591.
101 Meyers and Williams, note 2 supra, at 594.
105 See, e.g., Rule NRo-9-05(A) of the Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil
and Gas [hereinafter cited as NRol.
1*1 Meyers and Williams, note 2 supra, at 598.
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exceeded demand.0 7 In times of high demand, however, it can be used
to prevent waste by minimizing loss of reservoir energy and maximize
ultimate recovery by limiting production to the maximum efficient
rate.0 8 As Meyers and Williams noted,"9 the Ohio legislature rejected
market demand prorationing in enacting § 1509.40 forbidding "limi-
tation of production of oil or gas for any reason whatsoever,""10 but
the final phrase of the prohibition is so broad that it appears to rule
out prorationing to prevent waste as well.' The short-term advan-
tages of higher than maximum efficient rates of production in times
of energy shortages are apparent, but the long-term impact of re-
duced total recovery is just as real and arguably more important.
Therefore, § 1509.40 should be amended, either to delete the prohibi-
tion on prorationing altogether or to make it clear that the section is
intended only to prohibit market demand prorationing-at least as
to the deeper geological formation."" The effect of either amend-
ment would be substantially the same, since the demand for Ohio
production so far exceeds the supply that it is almost inconceivable
that a case could ever be made for market demand prorationing. 112
There is, moreover, a clear need for the Chief of the Division to be
able to work toward maximizing ultimate production through prora-
tioning and regulation of gas-oil and water-oil ratios, a need that
could be met by the amendments just proposed regarding § 1509.40
and the authorization of rules on waste.
A related defect in the original statute and the subsequent
amendments appears in § 1509.20, which expressly permits the flaring
of natural gas where "there is no economic market at the
well. .... 11,13 As noted by Meyers and Williams,"' this deprives the
Division of the power to force gas connections in the field and permits
"0 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, note 4 supra, at 312-13.
" Id., at 227-28.
"o Meyers and Williams, note 2 supra, at 600.
hO OHIO REV. CODE ANN., § 1509.40 (Page Supp. 1974).
Il Meyers and Williams note 2 supra, at 601 argue that it should not be so interpreted,
but we believe that the language of the statute is so broad as to be difficult to rationalize away.
111.1 Historically, most Ohio drilling has been in the shallower Berea and Clinton forma-
tions that develop low reserves with little or no flush production. For both economic and
engineering reasons it would be inappropriate to institute prorationing of any kind for these
formations. As Ohio experiences drilling of deeper formation, however, it appears advisable
for the Chief to have available the tool of conservation prorationing for the deeper horizons.
"2 See generally, Ohio Energy Emergency Commission, Ohio Energy Profiles, Voi. I -
State Level Data (July, 1975).
" OHIO REv. CODE ANN., § 1509.20 (Page Supp. 1974).
" Meyers and Williams, note 2 supra, at 637.
OIL AND GAS
operators to reap the short-term advantage of oil production at the
sacrifice of long-term production of gas. The quoted phrase of
§ 1509.20 should be deleted, so that the Chief can limit or proscribe
flaring in the interest of conservation and the maintenance of reser-
voir pressure.
In their article Meyers and Williams also criticized l5 the
provision of § 1509.25 that apparently prohibits the Chief of the
Division from requiring the use of a "survey grid coordinate system
with fixed or established unit boundaries."'' 6 We agree with their
suggestion" 7 that this restriction should be repealed, since the use of
a rectangular grid system would make it much easier for the Division
to set effective spacing standards, particularly in the portions of the
state platted as part of the Northwest Territory.
Meyers and Williams' recommendation that §§ 1509.24 and
1509.25 should be amended to broaden the purposes for which well
spacing orders may be entered also continues to be valid.' In addi-
tion, it should be noted that § 1509.24 presently limits the authority
of the Chief of the Division to issue well spacing orders to situations
involving new wells."' Because of Ohio's long history as an oil and
gas producing state,20 there are a substantial number of fields con-
taining old or abandoned wells that, as the energy shortage worsens
and the prices of oil and natural gas increase, may be reworked or
be sites for new drilling. Many of those fields were wastefully and
inefficiently operated when their production was flush, and the Chief
of the Division should be given the tools necessary to prevent a reoc-
currence.
The proposed amendments to the statute raise the issue of the
role of the Technical Advisory Council (TAC). We agree with Mey-
ers and Williams that the TAC should not have a veto over the
decision making process.12' The Division should, however, be obli-
15 Meyers and Williams, note 2 supra, at 597.
t OHIO REV. CODE ANN., § 1509.25 (Page Supp. 1974).
'J Meyers and Williams, note 2 supra, at 635.
I Meyers and Williams, note 2 supra, at 597.
"' Section 1509.24 provides in relevant part that "the chief. . . with the approval of the
technical advisory council . . . may establish . . . rules and regulations relative to . . .mini-
mum distances from which a new well may be drilled or an existing well deepened, plugged
back, or reopened to a source of supply different from the existing pool .... Thus, the Chief
may not issue spacing orders in respect of wells in existence prior to the enactment of the statute
in 1965. The Chief should, however, have authority under the present statute to issue spacing
orders for new drilling in areas where there are old or abandoned wells.
110 See note 14 supra 3, at 12.
"I Meyers and Williams, note 2 supra, at 637.
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gated to consult with the TAC prior to adopting regulations prohibit-
ing waste and prior to the issuance of prorationing, antiflaring or
gridding orders of general impact. The Division of Oil and Gas is run
by competent career administrators, but its staff is small, and the
experience and expertise of the members of the TAC can be valuable.
It may also help to counterbalance the outside pressures on the politi-
cally appointed Chief and his superiors at the Department of Natural
Resources, pressures which may have nothing to do with conserva-
tion.
Enactment of these changes would significantly strengthen the
statutory scheme.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATUTE
A. Rules and Regulations
Although the statute specifically provides for the adoption of
administrative rules and regulations,' two of the present five chap-
ters of the rules and regulations were in existence prior to the enact-
ment of the conservation law in October of 1965. The chapters deal-
ing with operating procedures 23 and disposal of wastes 24 were ini-
tially adopted in 1964 and 1965 as emergency rules under the interim
legislation enacted in 1963.125 They were repromulgated with addi-
tions in 1965, shortly after the new law became effective. A third
chapter, governing secondary recovery operations, 16 was adopted in
late 1967. The fourth chapter, relating to safety standards, 2 was
promulgated in 1968 and became effective early in 1969. The fifth and
final chapter, dealing with the issuance of plugging permits,'2s was
adopted early in 1975. Because the rules and regulations are in the
main merely explanatory of various sections of the statute, only their
general scope will be outlined, although some of the more proble-
matic provisions will be considered in greater detail.
'21 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.03 (Page Supp. 1974).
123 Presently chapter NRo-I.
"I Presently chapter NRo-3.
'2 Under authority of§ 4151.03, which provided that "the division of mines shall enforce
and supervise the execution of all laws enacted . . . and for such purpose shall make, publish
and enforce necessary rules and regulations not inconsistent with the mining laws of this state."
In fact, chapters NRo-l and NRo-3 were intended to serve as a stop-gap conservation law





The basic rules for drilling and operation in Ohio are contained
in chapter NRo-1 ,12, which is entitled "Issuance of Permits for the
Drilling of Wells and Operation Thereof." The owner, the person
who has the right to drill on a particular tract, must obtain a drilling
permit to drill, deepen, reopen, convert to another use, or plug back
a well. 130 Before a permit is issued, cash or an insurance bond must
be posted to guarantee plugging and restoration,' and it must be
established that there will be compliance with the applicable spacing
requirements.3 2 Unless the well is to be located in a coal bearing
'2 Which stands for Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas, Chapter
I. Rules within each chapter are numbered consecutively; 01, 02 . . . 10, etc.
'" OHlo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.05 (Page Supp. 1974).
"I The cash deposit or bond is required by OHIo REv. CODE § 1509.07. The rules set the
amount of the deposit according to the depth of the well to be drilled and the number of wells
to be covered by the bond. If an operator chooses to post bonds on a well by well basis, then a
bond for a well with a proposed or actual depth of 1500 feet or less must be in the amount of
$750, while for deeper wells a face amount of $1500 is required. On the other hand, if, as is
more common, the operator chooses to post a so called "blanket bond" covering all wells he
may operate, the face amount required is $3500 for all wells with a proposed or actual depth
of 1500 feet or less and $5,000 for deeper wells. While bonding to guarantee performance is a
well established procedure, the amount of the bond required is obviously an arbitrary determi-
nation; one may question the logic of requiring one $5,000 bond for an operator who operates
three wells and one $5,000 bond for an operator who operates three hundred wells. Furthermore,
the cost of plugging operations has sky rocketed in recent years along with other costs asso-
ciated with operations. The addition of § 1509.072 extended the obligations of the bond to
include restoration, but there has been no increase or proposal to increase the bond amounts.
The thinking of the Division has probably been that the value of the casing and the equipment
on the well would easily cover the cost of plugging and land restoration in the event of default.
While liens or judgments filed against an oil or gas well usually attach to the oil and gas lease
and its equipment and technically take priority over claims of the state relating to plugging
and restoration, the purchaser of the equipment at foreclosure succeeds to the interest of the
debtor in the lease and thus becomes the "owner of the well" within the terms of § 1509.12
and obligated to plug the well and restore the premises. So long as the price of used equipment
remains at or above present levels, this appears accurate reasoning. If the operator defaults or
is otherwise unavailable, and there is little or no equipment to sell to cover the cost of plugging
and restoration, the Division's position is that the landowner must bear the cost. See the
discussion of the Vohlers case in text accompanying notes 234-47 infra. Seen in this light, the
purpose of the bond is to give the s4ate a lever to use against the operator, and the size of the
lever is less important than the fact of its existence. Nonetheless, at a time when theft of oil
field equipment is widespread, an increase in the amount of the bond required is indicated to
maintain the force of the statutory lever.
132 NRo-1-04 sets a sliding scale of minimum acreages and distances keyed to well depth,
as is shown in the following table.
Distance from
Minimum Well in Same Distance From
Depth Acreage Pool Boundary
0-1,000' Not less than one acre 200 feet 100 feet
1,000-2,000' Ten acres 460 feet 230 feet
2,000-4,000' Twenty acres 600 feet 300 feet
4,000' or
deeper Forty acres 1,000 feet 500 feet
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township, the Division must issue the permit if the requirements of
the rules and regulations are met. 133
Chapter NRo-3, which like chapter NRo-l predates the 1965
statute, deals with the disposal of saltwater and other wastes pro-
duced in operations. The heart of the chapter is in Rule 4,131 which
provides in relevant part that "[a]ll persons engaged in any phase of
salt-water disposal operations shall conduct such operations in a
manner which will not contaminate or pollute the surface of the land,
or water on the surface or in the subsurface .... ,,"31 The remaining
rules specify how disposal is to be accomplished. The absolute re-
quirement of rule 4 has, in recent years, produced considerable disa-
greement over the environmental acceptability of some disposal
methods. 136 In 1975, substantial amendments to chapter NRo-3 de-
lineated more completely what are acceptable procedures and im-
posed additional obligations on operators."'
The current spacing requirements were adopted November 1, 1967. Prior to that time the rules
provided that wells had to be drilled on at least ten acre tracts, not less than 460 feet from the
nearest well to the same formation, and not less than 230 feet from the boundary. The Chief is
also given discretion by § 1509.25 to provide for temporary minimum spacing in the vicinity of
discovery wells, in case the characteristics of the discovery well are such that it is not logical
to apply the standards summarized in the table above. The goal of the detailed spacing require-
ments and the discretion given to the Chief is to protect the rights of the owners of adjacent
tracts to recover the oil and gas under their tracts (their correlative rights) while achieving the
maximum total production of oil and gas without the drilling of unnecessary wells (economic
waste). A weakness of the Ohio statute noted by Meyers & Williams note 2 supra at 597, is
that § 1509.24 does not adopt as a standard for determination of drilling unit size the principle
that the drilling unit should be as large as the maximum area which can be drained by one
well. It does not appear, however, that this principle has been ignored; although it may be said
that the standards promulgated are more suited for oil wells than gas wells, and that gas wells
should have larger minimum drilling units than oil wells, the standards set are generally in
accord with those of other states for wells of similar depths.
.. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.08 (Page Supp. 1974).
'3 NRo-3-04.
'2 The broad prohibition of rule 4 is arguably in excess of the statutory authority, for
the rule bars contamination of the "surface of the land" as well as water found on the surface
or in the subsurface, while the language of the statutory provision upon which the rule is based
refers only to contamination of water. As a practical matter, however, it would seem preferable
for the Division to have jurisdiction over both land and water that might be damaged in oil
operations, whatever the terms of the statute may be. Furthermore, prevention of pollution of
the land is essential to prevention of pollution of water, since oil spilled on land is likely to end
up in water. Thus the authority in question may be inferred.
I See discussion in Lowe, Legislative Report-Columbus, March 6, 1975 (a paper pre-
sented to the winter meeting of the Ohio Oil & Gas Association).
131 In January 1975, a requirement than an annual report of saltwater disposal be pro-
vided to the Division was added to rule 4 of chapter NRo-3. At the same time, rule 5 was
substantially rewritten to provide expressly for the authority of the Division to regulate annular
disposal of saltwater. Saltwater produced along with hydrocarbons from oil and gas bearing
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Secondary recovery operations, which are defined as involving
the "injection of natural gas, water, or other fluids or gases into an
oil or gas reservoir to increase pressure or to retard pressure decline
• .. for the purpose of increasing the recovery of hydrocarbons
.... ,"138 are the subject of chapter NRo-5. Attempts at secondary
recovery operations in Ohio have been rare, however, so the chapter
has been seldom referred to. The basic scheme and content of these
rules are the same as those of chapter NRo-1; regulation and moni-
toring of secondary recovery operations is structured around a permit
system.
The major regulations relating to safety standards are included
in chapter NRo-9.19 Both a broad duty to use "all reasonable means
to safeguard against hazards to life, limb, and property""14 and spe-
cific requirements concerning various practices and devices 1, are
imposed upon "owners" and the "persons or organizations in con-
formations is often disposed of by deposit down a disposal well especially drilled for that
purpose, but the expense of such a procedure is substantial so that it is generally used in Ohio
only where large quantities of salt water are produced. More commonly in Ohio, salt water is
disposed of by annular disposal. The principle of annular disposal is to inject the saltwater
produced into the annulus, the space between the outer wall of the pipe placed in the well bore
and the side of the open hole that has been drilled. So long as the bore hole does not intersect
or pass close to any strata containing running or potable water, this is generally considered an
ecologically acceptable means of disposal. The key, of course, is to determine whether the bore
hole has passed close to strata with potable or running water. The Division has exercised the
authority for such determination since its establishment; the 1975 amendment effectively legi-
timizes that exercise. As this is written, however, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency
is reportedly drafting rules under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(f) et seq.
(1974), which would, if adopted, effectively ban annular disposal.
Also substantially rewritten in January, 1975, was rule 8 of chapter NRo-3, dealing with
temporary storage of oil field wastes. Prior to the amendment, rule 8 provided that saltwater
could be temporarily stored in earthen pits or in tanks so long as such pits or tanks were liquid
tight and constructed so as to prevent escape of the saltwater. The chief difficulty with this
formulation was that it did not define "temporarily," and saltwater stored in open pits for a
long enough time will either evaporate, leaving the salt encrusted on the soil, or leak into the
soil. At the hearings on the proposed rule, debate swirled around the period of time within which
pits or tanks ought to be drained and the saltwater disposed of elsewhere. The eventual compro-
mise was 180 days, but the amendment also substantially expanded and specified the terms of
the rule.
"I NRo-5-01.
131 Logically, this chapter should be numbered NRo-7. The reason for the "skip" in
numbers is that rules with the designation NRo-7 were proposed but never adopted. In early
1968, a public hearing was held on ten rules which were to govern the issuance of permits for
and the operation of wells drilled to geological strata beneath the waters of Lake Erie. In 1970
the Ohio Legislature enacted § 1505.07, prohibiting any drilling for oil and gas in Lake Erie
for two years. In 1972 the ban was extended for a further two years, and in 1974 for yet another
four years. Thus, proposed chapter NRo.7 became moot.
', NRo-9-02.
1,2 NRo-9.03, -04 and -05.
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trol"'' 2 of work. In the event of a violation of the rules, either the
Chief or his inspectors may issue orders requiring affirmative action
to the persons responsible. 43
The most recent chapter of the oil and gas rules and regulations,
NRo- I, deals with the plugging of wells. Promulgated in January,
1975,' this chapter consists only of a general definition rule 4 ' and a
provision regulating issuance of plugging permits. 6 It specifies pro-
cedures intended to ensure that the Division and affected landowners
have adequate notice that wells are to be plugged.'47
The major defect of the oil and gas rules is that each chapter
appears to have been drafted as a restatement of a particular
statutory section and not as a planned portion of a long-range
pattern. As a result, a patchwork of overlapping general provisions
has been created. This is not to condemn the existing rules, for they
have functioned adequately to date, as will be seen in the subsequent
review of administrative and judicial decisions. It would be better,
however, if each chapter were created as a part of an integrated body
of rules, and if the rules clarified and explained the technical concepts
laid down in the statute. If oil and gas operations in Ohio increase,
"z NRo-9-02.
143 Id.
11 Filed with the Ohio Secretary of State January 3, 1975; effective January 22, 1975.
"4 NRo-l 1-01.
'" NRo-I 1-02.
"7 The Division's interest in notice is that it be able to maintain records accurately showing
the location of plugged wells and that its inspectors be able to be present at the plugging
operation. See § 1509.13. The interest of the landowners upon whose land wells to be plugged
are located is in protecting their right to royalties and free gas. Most leases in use in Ohio
provide for a 1/s royalty to the landowner and entitle him to use gas from the well for heat and
light in his home and for farming operations. With the advent of the energy shortage, the value
of these landowner rights increased considerably. At the same time, soaring market prices for
used casing and equipment led some operators to plug marginal wells that they might have
continued producing a few years earlier. The interaction of these factors produced a rash of
complaints from landowners to the Division and to state legislators. Though § 1509.13 of the
statute requires written notification of landowners, rule NRo-I 1-02 goes further by requiring
that the notice be delivered by personal service or certified mail to ensure its delivery. Receipt
of notice before the fact may seem of little consolation to an aggrieved landowner, but he has
thus been afforded an opportunity to make arrangements for an alternate power source to the
gas he was using. In addition, there are cases from other jurisdictions that hold that an operator
may not plug an oil or gas well so long as marginal revenues exceed marginal costs on the
grounds that to do so would be a breach of his implied covenant to reasonably produce the
well. See, e.g., Okmulgee Supply Corp. v. Anthis, 189 Okla. 139, 114 P. 2d 451 (1940) and
Patton v. Rogers, 417 S.W. 2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). The rule would be stronger if it
provided for a reasonable minimum period of notice to assure that affected landowners had
adequate opportunity to seek counsel or obtain other supplies of energy, but such a limitation
is likely to be implied by the Division as a matter of practice.
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as may be expected as the hydrocarbon shortage becomes more acute,
greater demands will be placed on the administrative apparatus.
B. Interpretation of the Law
The rules and regulations and the statute are administrered by
the Division of Oil and Gas through adjudication orders. "8 Any party
adversely affected by an adjudication order has the right of appeal
to the Oil and Gas Board of Review"' and ultimately to the courts,
beginning with the Franklin County Common Pleas Court."' In its
first ten years of existence, the Division of Oil and Gas issued 217
adjudication orders,"' only twenty-one of which were appealed to the
Board of Review. Eleven of the appeals resulted in opinions of the
Board.12 Since those opinions of the Board of Review are the only
"' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.01(d) (Page 1969) defines adjudication as "the determina-
tion by the highest or ultimate authority of an agency of the rights, duties, privileges, benefits
or legal relationships of a specified person. ... An adjudication order is any order of an
agency which affects the rights and duties of the individuals subject to the order.
. OHno REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.36 (Page Supp. 1974).
"s OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.37 (Page Supp. 1974).
"' The number of adjudication orders issued by the Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas
has varied substantially from year to year, as may be seen from the following chart prepared
from Reports of Oil and Gas Conservation Activities submitted annually to the Interstate Oil
Compact Commission by J. Richard Emens, Member, Legal Committee, the Interstate Oil
Compact Commission.
Adjudication Orders 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
1 8 3 18 66 41
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
34 17 9 7 13
TOTAL - 217
The numbers of adjudication orders issued may be deceptive, however, because an adjudication
order is not necessarily related to one incident or one well. For example, two of the eighteen
orders in 1968 related to noncompliance with bonding requirements on thirty-one wells. An-
other twelve of the eighteen orders directed the plugging of thirty-three idle wells. In recent
years, there appears to have developed a trend toward the use of a separate adjudication order
for each well, permit, application or other item that may be the subject matter of the adjudica-
tion order. It may be surmised that the practice that was previously followed was based on the
premise that an individual operator is responsible for all the wells which he may have under
his control, so that one adjudication order might rule upon a particular problem with respect
to as many wells as that operator managed that shared the problem. Because of the lack of
consistency in the Division's practice, however, an analysis of the number of adjudication orders
issued on a year by year basis is not a reliable guide to the activity of the Division.
"I The remaining ten appeals were either withdrawn by the appellants or dismissed after
the appellants failed to appear for the hearing scheduled. The Division has been willing to
negotiate with appellants to solve problems that have resulted in adjudication orders. Often
those negotiations are successful from the viewpoint of both sides, as the rate of dismissals
would seem to indicate.
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precedents interpreting the statute"3 and since some of them are
significant to an understanding of the law as it has developed, it will
be useful to consider them in conjunction with their subject matter.'54
(1) Scope of Discretion
The first decision of the Board of Review dealt with the issuance
of permits and the scope of the discretion of the Chief in dealing with
problems of well spacing. The tract involved in Barton A. HoI'15
contained acreage that should have been sufficient for the drilling of
four wells, but because of the irregular shape of the land, at least one
of the four wells would have been slightly closer to the boundary line
than the two hundred thirty foot minimum distance required by the
well spacing rule. " The appellant wanted to drill two wells closer to
the boundary line than the minimum distance specified in the rule and
so requested in his permit applications. In separate adjudication or-
ders, the Chief refused to issue either permit, on the grounds that the
applications did not substantially conform 57 with the minimum dis-
tance standards.
The Board reversed the Chief with respect to one adjudication
order-the first of only two times in its history that the Board of
Review has failed to uphold the Chief's decision. The Board exam-
ined the plat map of the property and noted that the Chief had
indicated that safety factors did not present a problem in the cases
before it, that the appellant had attempted unsuccessfully to pool
voluntarily with adjoining property owners, and that the location of
wells on adjoining properties was such that they were likely to drain
the oil from under the property in question to the detriment of the
"I Six of the Board's decisions have been appealed to the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas, but all but two have either been upheld by that court in pro forma decisions
or dismissed by agreement of the parties. Vohlers and Baldwin Producing Corp. are pending,
as of the time of this writing, in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (see notes 207
and 234 infra).
I" Because opinions of the Oil and Gas Board of Review are neither published nor anno-
tated in the Ohio Revised Code (omissions that should be remedied), we will devote more space
to discussion of the facts presented and issues raised in such cases than their complexity would
otherwise warrant.
"5 Appeal Nos. 2 and 3, Ohio Oil and Gas Board of Review, April 12, 1966.
'- Rule IV of the rules and regulations of the Division of Oil and Gas, as adopted by the
Division of Mines as emergency rules on March 10, 1964. On December 14, 1965 rule IV was
modified and recodified as NRo-I-04.
"I Rule IV(A)(1) provided in relevant part that "[tihe Division of Oil and Gas should not
issue a permit. . . unless the proposed well location and spacing substantially conform to the
requirements. ... The language of NRo-1-04 is identical in this respect.
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owner and operator of the subject property. 157 .1 The Board granted
the permit, ruling that the protection of correlative rights15 was of
utmost importance. 58" With respect to the other permit application,
the Board suggested to the appellant that his proposed site be moved
a short distance to a location that would fall within the distances set
by the well spacing standards.
151.2
The importance of the Holl decision is that at its very first
opportunity-less than six months after the effective date of the stat-
ute-the Board of Review took the position that the Division of Oil
and Gas should be given considerable discretion rather than be tied
to the express terms of the statute or the rules adopted under it.151
The Board's decision indicated further than the Division was to
interpret the statute in light of its purposes of prevention of waste and
protection of correlative rights. In sum, the Holl decision gave an
impetus to flexible administration to the Division that has been car-
ried forward throughout the past ten years. 159-1
Having given notice of its view of the new statute, the Board of
Review next delineated the scope of its function as the reviewing
agency under that legislation. In Jerry Moore, Inc.,"'0 the Board
opened its proceedings to parties who, though they were not parties
to the action in the strict legal sense, had an economic interest in the
outcome. The Moore case raised issues relating to the mandatory
"'' Holl, note 155 supra, at 3-4.
5 For a discussion of correlative rights, see text at note 6 supra.
m. Holl, note 155 supra, at 3.
2152 Id. at 4.
"I Conceptually, there are two types of conservation statutes: self-executing and regula-
tory. A self-executing conservation statute is one that defines specifically what is required or
prohibited and permits enforcement either by criminal prosecution or civil action by an injured
party. The administrator has as his main task the policing of its enforcement under such a law.
A regulatory conservation statute is one that broadly defines the principles sought to be effected
or the goals sought to be achieved and delegates the determination of the means to be used to
an agency or an administrator. The role of an administrator under such a statute is much
broader than under a self-executing type of statute. INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION,
note 22, supra, at 174. As a practical matter, of course, no statute fits neatly into either
classification. The Ohio statute is an amalgamation of clauses, some of which may fit into one
classification, some into the other, and some into neither. It could have been interpreted very
narrowly with respect to the power of the Division.
1501 Later in the Lyons case the Board again urged a practical approach and indicated
the Chief's flexibility included the responsibility to meet with parties to arrive at a solution that
satisfied the intent of the statute. Specifically in that case the Board said "the Chief may, and
should, in such instance call an informal negotiation type meeting to attempt to determine prior
to granting permits on regular locations which then may necessitate an exception tract, whether
mandatory or voluntary pooling would be advisable."
120 Jerry Moore, Inc. Appeal No. I, Ohio Oil and Gas Board of Review (July 1, 1966).
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pooling' and exception tract6 2 sections of the statute. The appellant
objected to the presence of other operators at the hearing and to their
offers of evidence. At that time, the relevant language of the statute
provided only that "either party to the appeal may submit such evi-
dence as the board deems admissible." ' The Board swept aside the
literal language of the statute and overruled the objection raised by
the Moore company. The Board noted that Moore's position was
inconsistent with its demand that a hearing on mandatory pooling be
permitted, since the hearing would have included the other parties
who took part in the session before the Board, and found that the
other parties either appeared as witnesses called by the state or that
their appearances were waived by the Moore company, since it gave
notice of the hearing to them.
The Board had to go beyond the literal terms of the statute as it
then read to reach its result " in this appeal. In so doing it evinced
an intent to take a solution oriented approach to hearings before it.
Throughout its ten-year history, the Board has avoided unnecessary
technical entanglements and has directed its attention to the substan-
tive issues brought before it. Whether this approach has resulted from
the Board's mindfulness of its obligation to make "the order which
it finds the chief should have made' ' 65 or from other factors, it is
consistent with the development of valid conservation law and it has
preserved the Board's flexibility.
(2) Mandatory Pooling
The circumstances under which an operator might be entitled to
a mandatory pooling order 6' under § 1509.27 were also at issue in
the Moore case. The facts developed at the hearing before the Board
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (Page Supp. 1974).
2HIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.29 (Page Supp. 1974).
163 Act of July 6, 1965, 131 Ohio Laws 482, 483 (repealed 1967).
"I The following year, 1967, § 1509.36 was amended so that it now reads in relevant part
that: "[e]ither party to the appeal or any interested persons who, pursuant to board rules and
regulations has been granted permission to appear, may submit such evidence as the board
deems admissible." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.36 (Page Supp. 1974).
6 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.36 (Page Supp. 1974).
666 Mandatory pooling is defined as "the bringing together as required by law or a valid
order of regulation, of separately owned tracts sufficient for the granting of a well permit under
applicable spacing rules." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, note 4 supra, at 68-69. Mandatory pooling
both protects correlative rights (by permitting the participation of small tract owners who might
not otherwise be able to meet spacing requirements) and prevents waste (by making it possible
to enforce spacing requirements so that unnecessary wells are not drilled).
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showed that the appellant wanted to drill a well on an eight acre
portion of a one hundred and seventy-four acre tract.
The appellant requested a hearing pursuant to the mandatory
pooling statute.' The Chief refused to hold such a hearing, however,
relying on advice of the attorney general that the term "tract" as used
in the statute meant, according to § 1509.01(J), "a single, individually
taxed parcel of land appearing on the tax list." Since the "tract" by
this definition totalled one hundred and seventy-four acres, far more
than was necessary under the then applicable spacing requirements,
the Chief concluded that the appellant had no right to a hearing on
the question of whether or not a mandatory pooling order should be
issued.
The Board criticized the position taken by the state, on the
grounds that:
: * * an examination of said sections discloses that the word "tract"
is used therein at least thirty-nine times and that in several instances
where used a narrow construction of the language, "a single, indi-
vidually taxed parcel of land appearing on the tax list" would be
entirely unworkable. . . .
This Board is of the opinion, and believes that the legislature in-
tended, that an integral part of conservation is to encourage devel-
opment of oil and gas resources in the state of Ohio. As a conse-
quence thereof, this Board questions whether, in the event a party
wished to drill a wildcat well in a location similar to that set forth
... and a preponderance of the geological and geophysical evi-
dence indicated a test well was warranted, and if all reasonable
efforts had been made to voluntarily pool but were unsuccessful, a
narrow construction of the definition of the word "tract" would be
utilized to prevent such well from being drilled. "
However, the Board upheld the decision of the Chief on another
ground. It noted that § 1509.27 set forth two conditions that had to
be met before a mandatory pooling hearing could be held. First, it
had to be shown that the tract of land in question was of insufficient
size or shape to meet the requirements for drilling; this, the Moore
company had done. Second, however, the owner had to show that
he had been unable to form a drilling unit by a voluntary pooling
agreement on a "just and equitable basis."' 9 In the Moore case, the
'" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (Page Supp. 1974).
" Moore, note 160 supra, at 17-18.
"' In 1967, § 1509.27 provided in relevant part that:
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appellant had offered the owners of leases on adjacent properties the
alternatives of straight cost participation or participation under an
agreement by which the Moore company would pay all of the costs
of drilling, completing and equipping, but the adjacent lease owners
would receive nothing until twice what would have been their share
of those costs had been recouped by Moore. This formulation, the
appellant asserted, offered the other owners the same alternatives
that they would be given by a mandatory pooling order, and was
therefore "just and equitable." The Board, noting that the alterna-
tives provided by the statute for nonparticipating owners subjected to
a mandatory order were not necessarily the only alternative bases for
voluntary pooling, rejected Moore's argument and explained the
mandatory pooling provisions of § 1509.27 by relating them to the
doctrine of correlative rights:
mandatory pooling, by definition, forces a party who is the owner
or lessee of property to use that property with another lessee and/or
for a purpose or price not acceptable to him. The importance of
conservation, and particularly that aspect of conservation, which
includes the development of the natural resources of this state, is the
factor which may tip the scales in favor of forcing such a person to
have his property utilized against his wishes. Such mandatory pool-
ing should occur only, however, when the statutory conditions have
been complied with. 7 '
The Board of Review thus announced its intention to take a strict
approach to the availability of mandatory pooling orders. While
mandatory pooling is often used as a means of protecting the corre-
If a tract of land is of insufficient size or shape to meet the requirements for
drilling a well thereon . . . and the owner has been unable to form a drilling unit
under [voluntary] agreement on a just and equitable basis, the owner of such a tract
may make application to the division for a mandatory pooling order.
If an owner does not elect to participate in the risk and costs of the drilling and
operation, or operation, of a well, he may elect to be a nonparticipating owner in
the drilling and operation, or operation, of the well, on a limited or carried basis upon
terms and conditions determined by the chief to be just and reasonable. If one or
more of the participating owners bear the costs of drilling, equipping, or operating
a well for the benefit of a nonparticipating owner, as provided for in the pooling
order, then such participating owner or owners shall be entitled to the share of
production from the drilling unit accruing to the interest of such nonparticipating
owner. . . until the. . . market value of such nonparticipating owner's share of the
production . . . equals double the share of costs charged to such nonparticipating
owner. (emphasis added)
1TO Moore, note 160 supra, at 20.
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lative rights of the owners of leases of small tracts, the Board, by
tying its rationale to a broad definition of conservation, limited the
availability of that protection where it would result in economic
waste.' It stated the following guidelines as to what is "just and
equitable" under the circumstances:
[i]t appears that the more the well approaches being a rank wildcat,
the lower the offer of override, money, etc. the party drilling the well
should have to make to have made a reasonable offer, and the more
the well approaches being an off-set well, the higher the value of the
offer which must be made to the party who is forced to contribute
to the mandatory pooling. Or, if a recoupment from production is
contemplated, the larger the recovery the drilling party should have
in the event of a rank wildcat; the nearer the well approaches being
an offset well, the lower the penalty on the party who is forced to
contribute to mandatory pooling."'
The Moore decision is also of interest because the Board's
reasoning implicitly recognized the criticism of Meyers and Williams
in 1965 of what they termed the "non-consent penalty provision" of
the Act. Meyers and Williams had objected to the "rigid" imposition
of a two hundred percent penalty in every case, stating that it would
have been better to have given the Chief discretion in this respect.7 3
The decision of the Board in the Moore case effectively adopted the
reasoning of Meyers and Williams and set the stage for the amend-
ment of § 1509.27 the following year.174
(3) Exception Tract Permits
The final issue in the Moore case concerned the interpretation
of § 1509.29, which grants the power to the Chief to issue permits for
drilling on "exception tracts."'75 The Moore company contended
that if it could not secure a mandatory pooling order under § 1509.27,
then it should be allowed to drill at its selected location under the
terms of § 1509.29.76 The Chief of the Division had refused to issue
"I' Footnote omitted.
"1 Moore, note 160 supra, at 20.
173 Meyers & Williams, note 2 supra, at 611.
"I As has been noted above, this section was amended effective December 1, 1967 to
provide that the Chief should have the discretion to determine what, if any, nonconsent pen-
alty should be levied, with two hundred percent recovery of costs being the maximum permitted
rather than the rule in every case.
275 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.29 (Page Supp. 1974).
PI The section in question provides in relevant part that:
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the drilling permit on the advice of the Ohio Attorney General's
office, based on its narrow interpretation of the meaning of the
word "tract."177 The Board upheld the decision of the Chief, how-
ever, on the grounds that the appellant had not shown that he had
applied for a permit to drill on the exception tract and that the appel-
lant had not established that he was unable to enter into a voluntary
pooling agreement.1 78 The Board listed four specific conditions to be
met before an exception tract permit could be obtained:
(1) It must be a tract for which a drilling permit may not be
issued, and
(2) There must be a showing by the owner-applicant that he is
unable to enter into a voluntary pooling agreement, and
(3) The owner-applicant must show that he would be unable to
participate under a mandatory pooling order, and
(4) The Chief must find that such owner would otherwise be
precluded from producing oil and gas from his tract because of mini-
mum acreage or distance requirements.179
Less than a year later, the Board again had before it a case on
the exception tract section. In Evelyn H. Lyons,"' two leases covered
a tract of land so shaped that the spacing requirements of rule NRo-
1-04 could not be observed. Further, the location of the buildings on
the eighteen and one-half acres in the tract was such that other Divi-
sion rules calling for minimum distances from inhabited dwelling
houses could not be observed. The owner of the lease had attempted,
without success, to enter into a voluntary pooling agreement with the
owners of adjoining leases. Mandatory pooling was impossible be-
cause the adjacent acreage was already within drilling units on which
productive wells were located. The Chief granted a drilling permit
pursuant to § 1509.29, and one of the adjacent leaseholders appealed
the decision to the Board of Review. The Board applied the four
Upon application by an owner of a tract for which a drilling permit may not be
issued, and a showing by him that he is unable to enter into a voluntary pooling
agreement and that he would be unable to participate under a mandatory pooling
order, the chief of the division of oil and gas shall issue a permit and order establish-
ing the tract as an exception tract if the chief finds that such owner would otherwise
be precluded from producing oil and gas from his tract because of minimum acreage
or distance requirements.
'" This interpretation was severely criticized by the Board; see text accompanying note
168 supra.
178 Moore, note 160 supra, at 27.
t" Id., at 26.
11 Appeal No. 4, Ohio Oil and Gas Board of Review, March 14, 1967.
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conditions outlined in the Moore case to the facts and upheld the
decision of the Chief. The Board also set forth, somewhat more fully
than it had in the Moore case, its view of the rationale underlying
§ 1509.29. The Board approvingly quoted Richard C. McConnell, 8'
then chairman of the Technical Advisory Council.'82
Section 1509.29, popularly called the "Exception Tract Paragraph"
was designed primarily for protection of correlative rights of land-
owners. That is, where a tract is of insufficient size and/or footage
requirements, a man could not be denied his right to the oil and gas
that is under him. Therefore, he is given an exception. . .[and the]
percentage of the oil and gas he is permitted to produce. . . would
be in direct proportion to the number of acres of the small tract...
to the spacing acreage then in effect.' m
The Board then observed that it believed the legislature had intended
that "no person should be precluded from producing oil and gas from
his property because of minimum acreage or distance requirements
where the [four] conditions set forth above are satisfied."'",
The Board's decisions with respect to exception tracts merely
analyzed the terms of the statute and applied them to the fact situa-
tions that were before the Board. They are significant, however, in
that they underscore the legislative intent that the exception tract
section should serve as a safety valve for the protection of the correla-
tive rights of landowners, but that it should not be too easily avail-
able.
(4) Plugging Orders
The problem most frequently dealt with by the Division in adju-
dication orders and by the Board of Review on appeal is the plugging
of nonproducing wells.8 5 The authority of the Division to order the
plugging of idle wells stems from § 1509.12, which as originally en-
acted provided:
[u]nless written permission is granted by the chief of the division of
oil and gas, no owner of any oil well shall permit said well to stand
more than six months without diligently pumping or flowing same.
"' Now Ohio's representative on the Interstate Oil Compact Commission.
112 Created by OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.38 (Page Supp. 1974).
' Lyons, note 180 supra, at 11.
"' Lyons, note 180 supra, at 12; see also Meyers & Williams, note 2 supra, at 598.
"n Between October 15, 1965 and December 31, 1975, seven of the eleven appeals decided
by the Board of Review involved plugging orders.
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Unless written permission is granted by the chief, all gas wells which
have ceased to be productive of gas for domestic or commercial
purposes and have not been operated for a period of six months shall
be plugged and abandoned by the owner.'86
The latter provision, as was noted by Meyers and Williams, "is aimed
at fire hazard from escaping gas and at pollution of sub-surface
strata."'' 7 The former provision, however, they called "curious" in
that it established "an absolute statutory duty of operation as a sub-
stitute. . for the common-law duty of prudent operation.'
As has been noted above,'89 the statute was amended in 1967 to
remove the six month statutory period, with a capability test being
substituted.
Unless written permission is granted by the chief, any well which is
or becomes incapable of producing oil or gas in commercial quanti-
ties shall be plugged, but no well shall be required to be plugged
under this section which is being used to produce oil or gas for
domestic purposes, or which is being lawfully used for a purpose
other than production of oil or gas."'
In 1969 the Board of Review was faced with the issue of the
meaning of the amendment, as it considered two cases in which plug-
ging orders were issued by the Chief. In Noble Cunningham"' and
John S. Kidd, Sr.,"' it was clear that the wells had not been producing
commercially for periods ranging from one year to eighteen months
at the time of the adjudication orders. The appellants asserted that
the deletion of the references to six months and the use of the word
"incapable" in the 1967 amendment to § 1509.12 were intended to
eliminate the statutory duty of operation identified by Meyers and
Williams and to revert to the common law duty of prudent opera-
tion."' The state, on the other hand, contended that the 1967 amend-
ment was intended to give the Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas
more latitude to act with respect to the issuance of plugging orders.
'" 131 Laws of Ohio 467 (emphasis added).
'n Meyers & Williams note 2 supra, at 596.
,' Id.
Il See text accompanying notes 83-85, supra.
,' OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. § 1509.12 (Page Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
9 Appeal No. 7, Ohio Oil and Gas Board of Review, September 10, 1969 appealed to
Franklin County Court of common Pleas, Case No. 437-238271, dismissed April 27, 1971.
112 Appeal No. 8, Ohio Oil and Gas Board of Review, September 10, 1969; appeal dis-
missed by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas September 19, 1969.
113 Such a duty to use reasonable diligence to produce the lease has been found to exist
in Ohio in Tedrow v. Shaffer, 23 Ohio App. 33, 155 N.E. 510 (1926).
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The Board of Review accepted the state's argument and refused
to interpret the 1967 amendment as a reversion to the common law
duty of prudent operation. It concluded that in repealing the six
month provisions the legislature had intended to eliminate "the possi-
bility that it would be improperly interpreted as authorizing a six-
month's delay in operations.. ."I" by imposing a statutory duty of
prudent operation and expanding the power of the Chief to order
plugging where he had "reasonable grounds to believe that such well
is not or will not produce oil or gas in commercial quantities."'95
The reasoning of the board in the Cunningham opinion is not
entirely convincing, although its conclusion appears warranted. The
Board based its interpretation primarily on the 1967 report by the
Ohio State Bar Association's Committee on Oil and Gas Law, which
had drafted the language that later became House Bill 310.
This amendment constitutes legislation designed to promote reform
in the law. The existing statutory language suggests than an owner
may permit a well to stand almost six months and if written permis-
sion is granted by the chief of the division of oil and gas, may go
longer than six months without diligently pumping or flowing same.
Oil and gas cases dealing with the implied convenant to diligently
operate a lease impose the prudent operator standard upon all oper-
ators. In some instances a prudent operator would not permit a well
to stand for thirty days without diligently pumping same. An arbi-
trary six months figure creates confusion and could encourage liti-
gation over the question whether the statutory language intended to
permit a six months delay in operations." 6
In fact, however, the language of the Bar Association Committee
Report is ambiguous and certainly not inconsistent with the conclu-
sion that the intent of the amendment is to revert to the common law
prudent operator standard; the Bar Committee simply criticized the
arbitrary six month's figure. The key to the Board's reasoning may
be seen from the following:
[a] literal interpretation of the 1967 amendment to Section 1509.12
• . . would. . . impose upon the state a duty to establish scientific
proof that an idle well was not capable of producing oil or gas in
"I Brief for Attorney General, quoted with approval in Noble Cunningham, note 191
supra, at 7.
,9 Id., at 10.
26 Report of the Oil and Gas Law Committee, 39 OHfo BAR 1225, 1227 (1966).
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commercial quantities. Surely, the legislature did not intend to im-
pose such an unreasonable burden upon the division of oil and gas.'9
[T]here are many instances when wells should not be allowed to
stand idle for more than a few days and certainly not a six-months
period; in cases of such oil and/or gas wells, there may be fire
hazards, the possibility of leakage or seeping and even other hazards
from open but uncompleted wells.'
[We are] of the opinion that the basic intent of the revised 1509.12
was to allow the Chief more latitude in carrying out the initial
legislative mandate of not allowing wells to stand idle .... 199
Thus, the Board of Review again seized the opportunity to assert that
Ohio's conservation legislation was to be broadly administered.
The prudent operator standard is the usual test for determining
whether the implied covenants have been met by oil and gas opera-
tors. The lessee is required under it to reach the level of performance
that would be met by an ordinary, prudent operator under the same
or similar circumstances. 211 Ohio's statutory duty, as viewed by the
Board of Review, differs primarily in that it focuses not on what a
hypothetical prudent operator would do under the circumstances, but
rather on the reasonableness and good faith of the Chief of the Divi-
sion of Oil and Gas, and on the integrity of the administrative system
rather than on the substantive issue of whether the well is technically
capable of production. The "test is whether the Chief of the Division
of Oil and Gas has reasonable grounds to believe that such well is
not or will not produce oil or gas in commercial quantities. 2 2' The
Board's decision reflects a sound administrative policy, although, as
will be noted below, the delegation of authority that the Board found
in the 1967 amendment2 2 has been challenged in the courts. 213
Having concluded that the 1967 amendment did not adopt the
prudent operator standard, the Board suggested a number of criteria
for determining whether the Chief had reasonable grounds to believe
that a given well was incapable of producing oil or gas in commercial
quantities. The criteria were:
Mn Brief for Attorney General, quoted in Noble Cunningham, note 191 supra, at 8.
113 Note 191 supra, at 10.
"I Id. at 11.
200 See Meyers & Williams, note 2 supra, at 315.
201 Noble Cunningham, note 191 supra, at 10.
202 Act of Sept. 1, 1967, 132 Ohio Laws 693 (effective Dec. 1, 1967); 132 Ohio Laws 693.
2 See discussion of State v. Wallace in text accompanying notes 208-33.
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(1) Has the owner of the well requested permission from the
chief for the well to stand idle and presented firm, reasonable plans
which he is capable of carrying out to produce oil or gas in commer-
cial quantities?
(2) How recently the well has, in fact, produced oil or gas in
commercial quantities and how much oil or gas has been sold?
(3) Is the well equipped sufficiently with both surface and in
hole equipment to allow for commercial production?
(4) How recently have actual good faith on-site attempts been
made to produce the well in commercial quantities?
(5) Has the state caused investigation to be made on the well
site?"'
Four years later, in its next opinion dealing with the plugging
provisions of the law, the Board added a sixth criterion. In
Sickafoose,20 5 the appellant contended that the power of the Chief to
order the plugging of idle wells was limited by § 1509.05, which
requires a permit for the drilling of a well. The appellant argued that
where the Chief granted a permit218 to drill a well, the Chief has no
right to use the plugging order to force the diligent completion and
equipping for production of that well. An uncompleted well, argued
the appellant, could not be considered incapable of producing oil and
gas. 211. The Board of Review rejected these contentions and held in
favor of the Chief, relying upon the five criteria suggested in
Cunningham and suggesting that the question whether the well had
been drilled to its intended depth should be an additional criterion in
determining whether the Chief's actions were reasonable. 211-2 This
additional criterion seems to presume that § 1509.05 creates a re-
quirement of due diligence in the completion of a permitted well. The
impact of the sixth criterion is that failure to continue a well to its
intended geological horizon or to complete it within a reasonable time
after commencement of drilling is a factor to be weighed against the
operator and in favor of the Chief in determining whether the Chief's
plugging order was reasonable. In brief, the operator must proceed
with diligence to complete and equip his well or risk a plugging order.
IN Note 191 supra, at 11.
10 Appeal No. 16, Ohio Oil and Gas Board of Review (January 31, 1973) appealed to
Franklin Co. Court of Common Pleas on March 1, 1973, Case No. 73CV-03-762, dismissed
November 12, 1974.
Rule NRo-0-02.
2,.1 Sickafoose, note 205 supra, at 5.
2.2 Id. at 9-10.
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The limits of the Chief's power to order the plugging of idle wells
were tested three more times before the Oil and Gas Board of Review
in 1973 and 1974, but the tests led to no new administrative develop-
ments." 7 The law in this area would be clear but for a 1974 court
opinion and a 1975 ruling of the board. State v. Wallace,05 the only
reported judicial opinion interpreting the Ohio oil and gas conserva-
tion law, did not result from an appeal of a decision of the Board of
Review, but rather from a prosecution instituted under § 1509.991°9
by the attorney general. In March, 1974, the Findlay Municipal
27 In Lynn, Appeal No. 17, Ohio Oil and Gas Board of Review (January 17, 1973), the
Board applied principles laid down in Cunningham to another fact situation with the same
result. Lynn involved a plugging order issued against the operator of an oil well drilled in the
late 1930's and located within the city of Cleveland, close to the waters of Lake Erie. No
production from the well had been sold for several years previously and a fire at the site in
1970 had destroyed some of the equipment necessary to produce the well. The appellant claimed
that the Chief's order in 1971 to plug the well was unreasonable because the well was capable
of producing oil and gas. The appellant asserted that there was significant bottom hole pressure
and that the well was standing full of fluid which was primarily oil. Finally, the appellant
contended that he had made diligent efforts to produce the well, but because of his concern
about legal action that might be instigated by the owners of a salt mine adjacent to the well,
he had been unable to bring his efforts to fruition. The Board rejected the appellant's conten-
tions and upheld the Chief's order, noting that the well was not presently equipped to produce.
and that if it were equipped to produce, relogging and refracturing would be necessary.
In Worthington Oil Company, Inc. Appeal No. 18, Ohio Oil and Gas Board of Review
(August 29, 1973) (appealed to Franklin County Board of Common Pleas, Case No. 73CV-
12-4236, dismissed, July 29, 1975), the facts established that the well, located in the one-time
boom area of Morrow County, had been drilled by an unknown company several years prior
to 1968. In 1968 Worthington Oil Company reopened the hole and began to produce the well,
though no production was sold in 1968. Only one tank of oil was sold in 1969, and after that
date neither gas nor oil production had been sold from the well. No attempts had been made
to produce the well since September, 1972. On this basis, the Board upheld the Chief's order,
referring again to the criteria it had previously set forth to determine whether the Chief's actions
in any given case were reasonable. The appellant appealed the decision of the Oil and Gas Board
of Review to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (Case No. 73CV-12-4236). It was
dismissed as moot on July 29, 1975 after the appellant plugged all the wells on the premises in
question.
The Board's most recent interpretation of the plugging provisions of the oil and gas law
came in Baldwin Producing Corp. Appeal No. 13, Oil and Gas Board of Review (October 15,
1974), which involved some 400 to 500 wells located on several leases purchased by the appel-
lant in 1968. All of the wells in question had been drilled many years prior to 1968, some in the
second decade of the century, and many of them were buried beneath the surface of the land
The appellant had purchased the leases with the vaguely formed intent of reworking the wells
at a later point in time, but had been forced to plug them by orders from the Division of Oil
and Gas. Again, the Board of Review adhered to the principles enunciated in its earlier deci-
sions in upholding the Chief's order. The appellant appealed to the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas (Case No. 74CV-1 1-4255), where the appeal is pending.
"1 40 Ohio Misc. 2d 29, 318 N.E.2d 883 (1974).
10 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.99 (Page Supp. 1974).
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Court ruled that § 1509.12,210 the plugging section of the statute, was
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The case arose
from an adjudication order issued by the Division without a hear-
ing,211 ordering plugged three wells on leases owned by M. Neil Wal-
lace. Mr. Wallace simply ignored that order; he did not appeal to the
Board of Review or to the courts, and he did not even communicate
with the Division. In December, 1973 the Division sought to enforce
its order by prosecuting Mr. Wallace under § 1509.99.212 When the
defendant was arraigned, his counsel claimed that the plugging stat-
ute was an unconstitutional delegation of authority by the legislature,
and moved for dismissal of the complaint. The court granted permis-
sion for briefs to be filed on the issue of constitutionality, but the state
failed to file its brief on time, and the court ruled on the motion to
dismiss on the basis of the defendant's brief alone. The court focused
on the phrase "incapable of producing oil or gas in commercial
quantities" as used in § 1509.12, noting that it appeared "to leave the
Chief without the slightest guidelines in issuing plugging orders," '
and held that the Chief had "exercised authority that was not his to
accept nor the Legislature [sic] to give. ' 21 4
On the state's motion for reconsideration, the municipal court
restated its position that:
to permit the Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas to order a well
to be plugged, which is or becomes incapable of producing oil and
gas in commercial quantities, is an unwarranted and unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative authority, absent a clear and defina-
ble guideline for such a determination."'
2 § 1509.12 requires in relevant part that:
[u]nless written permission is granted by the chief, any well which is or becomes
incapable of producing oil or gas in commercial quantities shall be plugged ....
When the chief finds that a well should be plugged, he shall notify the owner to that
effect by order in writing and shall specify in such order a reasonable time within
which to comply. No owner shall fail or refuse to plug a well within the time specified
in the order. Each day on which such a well remains unplugged thereafter constitutes
a separate offense (emphasis added).
21 Adjudication Order 178, July 20, 1972.
212 The Division can attempt to effectuate its plugging orders by seeking an injunction
under § 1509.04, by bond forfeiture under § 1509.071, or by prosecution under § 1509.99, which
provides for fines from $100 to $500 for a first offense, and from $200 to $1000 for subsequent
violations. In Wallace, there was no bond because the wells in question were drilled prior to
the enactment of the statutory requirement. The state elected to prosecute rather than to seek
an injunction because it feared Mr. Wallace would leave the state, rendering an injunction
unenforceable as a practical matter.
21 40 Ohio Misc. 2d at 30-31, 318 N.E.2d at 885.
224 Id. at 31, 318 N.E.2d at 885.
2I Id. at 33, 318 N.E.2d at 886-87.
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It is possible for the Legislature to clothe the Chief of the Division
of Oil and Gas with the power to order a well to be plugged. But,
when they give him, alone, unbridled authority to determine if any
one well is producing in commercial quantities, that is an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative authority because there are no
guidelines. 21
The court of appeals dismissed the state's appeal217 on procedural
grounds that were upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court.2 18 The ruling
of the municipal court as to constitutionality we think was clearly
wrong. In reaching its decision, the court relied on Matz v. Curtis
Cartage Co.219 In that case the Ohio Supreme Court held that "[a]s
a general rule a law which confers discretion on an executive officer
or board without establishing any standards for guidance is a delega-
tion of legislative power and unconstitutional .... ,,221 The supreme
court in Matz went further, however, and stated an exception to
the general principle, into which the facts of both the Matz case and
the Wallace case fall:
but when the discretion to be exercised relates to a police regulation
for the protection of the public morals, health, safety or general
welfare, and it is impossible or impracticable to provide such stan-
dards, and to do so would defeat the legislative object sought to be
accomplished, legislation conferring such discretion may be valid
and constitutional without such restrictions and limitations.22'
The Matz case, on the basis of this exception, upheld the right of the
legislature to delegate authority to the public utilities commission to
prescribe safety regulations for motor transportation companies.
Matz may be distinguished from Wallace in that the public utilities
commission had promulgated safety regulations for motor vehicles,
whereas the Chief had never exercised his general authority under
§ 1509.03222 to promulgate rules defining when a well becomes incapa-
ble of producing in commercial quantities. As has been noted, how-
ever, the Oil and Gas Board of Review has devoted considerable
attention to the definition of the phrase "incapable of producing oil
266 Id. at 35, 318 N.E.2d at 887.
267 State v. Wallace, Case No. 5-74-7 (Ohio Ct. of App., Third App. Dis., June 5, 1974).
2i8 State v. Wallace, 43 Ohio St. 2d 1, 330 N.E.2d 697 (1975).
21 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N.E.2d 220 (1937).
2 Id. at 272, 7 N.E.2d at 222.
221 Id.
222 OHIO REv. CODE ANN., § 1509.03 (Page Supp. 1974).
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or gas in commercial quantities." 21 The memorandum filed by the
state in support of its motion to reconsider directed the attention of
the court to those determinations,"' but without success. Further-
more, as was also noted in the attorney general's memorandum, 221 the
term "commercial quantity" is well defined by precedent, custom,
and usage in the industry. Williams and Meyers2 26 define "commer-
cial quantity" as "a quantity of oil, gas or other minerals sufficient
for production in paying quantities," i.e. "production in quantities
sufficient to yield a return in excess of operating costs, even though
drilling and equipment costs may never be repaid and the undertaking
considered as a whole may ultimately result in a loss.' '127 In other
words, the phrase "incapable of producing oil or gas in commercial
quantities" means that the well is incapable of returning its marginal
costs, and that point is reached when the cost of operating the well
exceeds the revenue to be derived from operating it.228 Furthermore,
similar delegations of authority in the oil and gas legislation of other
states have repeatedly been upheld.29
The legislature's delegation of authority to the Chief of the Divi-
sion of Oil and Gas to determine whether a well is incapable of
commercial production is precisely the sort of delegation which the
Supreme Court of Ohio had in mind when it laid down the exception
to the general rule in Matz. The Ohio oil and gas law is a conserva-
tion statute, aimed at securing the rational and beneficial develop-
ment of the oil and gas resources of the state. Wells no longer capable
of economical production must be properly plugged in order to pro-
tect the environment and the safety of the populace. Whether a spe-
cific well has become incapable of producing oil or gas in commercial
2 See text at notes 185-206 supra.
21 Memorandum for State at 7.
22 Id.
226 See WILLIAMS & MEYERS note 4 supra, at 60.
227 Id. at 307-08.
m See also A. WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, TREATISE ON OIL AND GAS LAW, § 604.6.6(H)
and discussion notes, 12 OIL AND GAS REv. 695 (1960).
"I For example, in Wotton v. Bush., 41 Cal. 2d 460, 261 P.2d 256 (1953), it was contended
that the use of the phrase "field producing oil or gas" in the California statute without definition
was an unconsitutional delegation of legislative authority. The California Supreme Court,
however, held that the phrase "has an understandable meaning" in the industry and that the
Administrator had applied the phrase consistently for over sixteen years (when interpreting the
procedures of the statute in question), so that it must be assumed that the legislature intended
this construction to establish the standard. 261 P.2d at 261. The court concluded that the
delegation of power was limited by sufficient criteria to avoid a finding of an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative discretion. See also the cases collected in IA W. SUMMERS, TIIF LAW
OF OIL AND GAS, § 106 at 182-85 nn. 34-35 (1954).
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quantities is a determination that must be made on a well by well
basis, as the attorney general argued. A statutory attempt to define
the multitude of details that must be considered in making that deter-
mination of productive capability would have seriously taxed
legislative ingenuity,"' and would probably have been a waste of
time, given continued technological advances in production tech-
niques.
In the nature of things there must be many things on which the
wisdom of legislation must depend, which can only properly be
determined in the course of administration of the legislative will as
expressed in law . . . . There is in this no delegation of legislative
power, but it is the imposition of an administrative duty in order to
give practical effect to the enactment.2'
The Wallace case, of course, was a decision of Ohio's lowest
court, and so of dubious precedential value. It presents a hindrance
to the orderly development of oil and gas law in Ohio, however,
because it was reported (unlike most decisions of courts of that level)
and because it is at the municipal court level that most enforcement
proceedings are brought.u2
The state has met the Wallace decision squarely, instituting
prosecutions on facts similar to those of Wallace with the intent of
obtaining opinions from other courts to counterbalance Wallace. As
of this writing, only two opinions resulting from the state's activity
have come to light. One is an unpublished decision of the municipal
court of Bowling Green in which the court refused to follow the
Wallace reasoning on grounds similar to those outlined above.23 In
the other, also unpublished, the County Court of Putnam County
followed the Wallace decision. 331 It is to be hoped that the Bowl-
ing Green decision will be followed by other courts. It is also hoped
220 See Yee Bow v. City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 269, 273, 124 N.E. 132 (1919) quoted
in Matz, note 219 supra, at 282-83, 7 N.E.2d at 226.
21 Green v. State Civil Service Commission, 90 Ohio St. 252, 107 N.E. 531 (1914),
quoted at Matz, note 219 supra, at 283-84, 7 N.E.2d at 226.
232 In this connection, it is interesting to note that Wallace was relied upon by the County
Court of Harrison County in ruling unconstitutional a portion of Ohio's Mining Reclamation
Act in State v. Consolidation Coal Co., Central Division, 43 0. Misc. 77 335 N.E.2d 403
(1974), on procedural grounds (appeal dsm'd by the Ohio Supreme Court).
State v. Cherry Hill Village Company, Municipal Court of Bowling Green, Ohio,
Case No. 75-CR-B-430, opinion dated October 20, 1975 overruling motion to dismiss.
2322 State v. Wallace, County Court of Putnam County, Case No. 75CR8-9B, De-
cember 15, 1975; presently on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Appellate District.
Case No. 12-75-10.
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that such opinions will be published or otherwise made available to
the practicing bar.
Vohlers gave rise to a potentially troubling opinion of the Board
of Review concerning plugging.21 The Board had before it a plug-
ging order issued by the Division of Oil and Gas affecting a residen-
tial lot in Lorain County. Apparently, the owners of the lot, Mr. and
Mrs. Vohlers, had purchased the property without actual knowledge
that oil and gas wells had ever been drilled on it. Subsequently, gas
was discovered bubbling to the surface in a drainage ditch on their
property. The Division of Oil and Gas alleged that the gas came from
an unplugged well and issued a plugging order against the Vohlers.
The Board overruled the Chief on the grounds that he had failed to
sustain his burden of proof that the gas came from a well (rather than
from a fissure) and that the Vohlers were the owners of the well.
It is entirely proper that the Chief should have had the burden
of proof in the hearing. As the Board noted in its opinion, the appel-
lants' only opportunity to have the evidentiary hearing envisioned by
Ohio's Administrative Procedure Act 35 came when they appeared
before the Board of Review. There ought to be no presumption in
favor of the ruling of the Chief in such a situation.216 The Board
should look first at the facts on which the disputed orderof the Chief
was based and, on the basis of the evidence presented to it, determine
whether the burden of proof has been met by the Division. Then, the
Board should determine whether the facts established are sufficient
to justify the order issued as reasonable and lawful in light of the
criteria laid down by the Board in earlier decisions or other criteria
which may appear relevant. Moreover, one cannot dispute the
Board's finding that the Chief had failed to establish there was a well
within the meaning of the statute. The law grants the Chief the right
to order the plugging of wells217 and a well is defined as a bore
hole.m As the Board noted, "the evidence presented of the bubbling
of gas was not inconsistent with either the conclusion that there was
a bore hole on land in the vicinity not belonging to the appellants or
n3 Appeal No. 20, August 20, 1975 appealed to Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 75CV-10-4423.
2 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 119.06 (Page 1969) provides that no adjudication order shall
be valid unless an opportunity for a hearing is afforded. However, (c) excepts from this rule
an order of an authority within an agency if there is a right of appeal (either by statute or the
rules or the agency) to a higher authority within such agency and a right to a hearing on appeal.
2M Bloch v. Glander, 151 Ohio St. 381, 86 N.E.2d 318 (1949).
"I OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.12 (Page Supp. 1974).
zu OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.01(A) (Page Supp. 1974).
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with the conclusion that there was no bore hole at all and the gas
bubbling came from natural sources . ,, .I Nor can one quarrel
with the Board's criticism of the Chiefs failure to produce a "title
opinion or abstract as evidence for the Board to consider as to the
existence of outstanding oil or gas leases. '2 4 If there is an outstand-
ing valid oil and gas lease covering the premises, then the lessee under
that lease is the owner of any wells upon the property within the
meaning of section 1509.12.41 Therefore, the Division should have the
obligation of establishing that it is the landowner who has the right
to drill on the tract, either by presentation of current title evidence
or by the use of other competent evidence. 42
The Board went further than it needed to-indeed, too far-
however, when it found that the Chief had not established that the
Vohlers were the owners of the alleged well. The Board found that
the Chief had failed to sustain the burden of proof imposed because
one of his own exhibits, the warranty deed held by the Vohlers,
contained a restriction against oil or mining operations, and because
of the lack of any current outstanding oil or gas leases covering the
premises.243 The Board overlooked the meaning of the restrictions in
the warranty deed. Traditionally, property ownership has been de-
scribed as a bundle of sticks. A restriction on use in a deed is simply
a covenant between the grantor and the grantee and his successors in
interest that one or more of those sticks will not be used. The exist-
ence of the restriction does not mean that the stick, the right to
conduct drilling operations in this case, does not pass from the gran-
tor to the grantee.2 4 Thus, the restrictions in the deed from the Voh-
ler's grantor to them were logically irrelevant to the question of
whether the Vohlers were, under the conservation statute, the owners
of any existing wells on their property.
It is important to note that the Board in Vohlers did not overrule
z' Vohlers, note 234 supra, at 10.
240 Vohlers, note 234 supra, at 13.
241 See discussion in text accompanying notes 244-251.
z' For example, if there had been available in the Vohlers case a title opinion or abstract
indicating the presence of no outstanding oil and gas leases affecting the property when the
Vohlers purchased it, and if the state had elicited from Mr. and Mrs. Vohlers testimony to the
effect they had granted no leases on the property, then the Board could properly have concluded
that the Vohlers were the owners of the well within the meaning of the statute even in the
absence of current title information.
21' Id. at 13. If there had been an outstanding oil and gas lease on Vohlers' premises, the
lessee would have been the "owner" under § 1509.12 rather than the Vohlers.
211 A restrictive covenant is a restriction on use, but not a derogation of the estate. 7 J.
GRIMES, THoMPsoN ON REAL PROPERTY § 3162 at 121 (1962 Repl.).
OIL AND GAS
the criteria established in previous cases" 5 for determining the rea-
sonableness of plugging orders. The Board properly distinguished the
Vohlers' fact situation from the pattern of previous cases by noting246
that those earlier cases dealt with the question whether existing oil
and gas wells were capable of producing in commercial quantities
rather than the fact of the existence of the well. Because Vohlers is
distinguishable on its facts from the earlier plugging cases considered
by the Board, and bearing in mind the quasi-judicial nature of the
Board and the practical functions it serves under the Ohio statute, it
is to be hoped that future Board of Review hearings will not become
bogged down in lengthy debates over what is necessary to meet the
burden of proof.
The Board's decision in Vohlers is not inconsistent with the
position of the Chief that, if the operator cannot be held accountable,
the landowner should be obligated to plug any nonproducing wells on
his property. Even this analysis does not, however, provide a totally
equitable answer to the problem of orphan wells. There are probably
several thousand unplugged abandoned wells in Ohio whose opera-
tors are no longer available. 48 It does not seem fair or politically
acceptable to hold the present landowners responsible for plugging
them.
2I See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 190-207, supra.
216 Vohlers, supra note 234, at 8.
212 There are at least three compelling policy justifications for the Chief's position. First,
until the legislature allocates monies to be applied to plugging in such cases, there is no other
source of funds to do the necessary job. The purpose of plugging is to prevent physical waste
and pollution and to promote safety: an unplugged well not capable of commercial production
is either a present or potential source of waste, pollution or danger. Douglass, The Obligations
of Lessees and Others to Plug and Abandon Oil and Gas Wells, 25 Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas
Law and Taxation 123, 124 (1974). Plugging is central to the effectiveness of the statute, and
the logical legislative intent to be attributed to the provisions requiring it would define "owner
of the well" so as to include the landowner in the absence of a viable operator. Second, the
landowner (or his predecessors) has had, through royalties, the benefits of oil and gas operations
and has the possibility of profit from future operations on the premises: the burden should
follow the benefits. This statement assumes, of course, that the landowner owns the mineral
rights, as is almost always the case in Ohio and will become more so as the impact of the 1973
amendment applying Ohio's Marketable Title Act, §§ 5301.47-56, to severed oil and gas
interests after December 31, 1976 is felt. Third, the landowner usually becomes the legal owner
of the well at the time, or soon after, the last well on the premises stops producing. due to the
expiration of the oil and gas lease. Thus, the landowner is entitled to any value contained in
the equipment left on the well and should be held responsible for the costs of plugging it.
2" The Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas testified in 1974 to the legislative committees
then considering Amended House Bill 221, which broadened the scope of§ 1509.071 to permit
what monies were available in the oil and gas well plugging fund to be applied to the plugging
of orphan wells, that the Division had identified at least 1900 such wells, but that there were
certainly many more not yet located by the Division.
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A practical answer to this dilemma is found in a bill pending
before the Ohio legislature. Amended House Bill 2849 would direct a
portion of the severance taxes paid on hydrocarbons extracted from
currently producing Ohio wells to the fund established by
§ 1509.071 1 for the plugging of orphan wells,2' thus imposing upon
the present industry the burden of correcting the oversight of its
predecessors. The problems noted above may be rendered moot by
enactment of this or similar legislation.
On the whole, the statutory interpretations discussed have been
consistent with the definition of conservation developed above and
with the purpose of the oil and gas conservation law. The Board of
Review has given itself and the administrator broad latitude to make
decisions within the framework of the law, has limited the availability
to operators of the exception tract and mandatory pooling remedies,
and has found a statutory duty to produce. Almost as important, the
interpretations of the Board and their application by the Division
have apparently been accepted by the regulated industry.
Although the Wallace252 decision is regrettable and the reasoning
of the Board of Review in the Vohlers53 opinion leaves something
to be desired, those decisions do no significant damage to the inter-
pretative pattern that has evolved. Wallace is simply a bad decision,
probably motivated by the failure of the attorney general's office to
file its brief on time. Whatever precedential value it has will likely
be overcome by the series of cases being pressed by the attorney
general's office. The Vohlers opinion, on the other hand, has little
value as precedent because it turned upon a determination that the
Division had failed to meet its burden of proof.
In sum, the interpretations of the oil and gas conservation stat-
ute given during its first ten years generally have lent support to its
statutory scheme. Though they have not been numerous or widely
249 Am. H.B. 28, 111th General Ass'm. 1st sess. (1975), passed by the House on March
25, 1975; presently pending before the Senate Rules Committee.
210 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.071 (Page Supp. 1974).
15 In its present form, Am. H.B. 28 provides that § 5749.02 of the severance tax statute
shall be amended so that
not to exceed twenty-five percent [of the monies received by the treasurer of state
from severance taxes] shall be credited to the oil and gas well plugging fund to be
used to restore distressed lands, plug abandoned wells, or use abandoned wells for
the injection of oil and gas production wastes.
15 State v. Wallace, note 208, supra.
2 Note 234 supra. Appeal No. 20, Vohlers v. State, Ohio Oil and Gas Board of Review,
August 22, 1975.
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publicized, the interpretations provide a sound basis for administra-
tion of the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ohio's oil and gas conservation statute has provided a solid
foundation for the orderly development of this state's oil and gas
resources during the past ten years. As has been noted above, many
of the issues that initially concerned commentators and practitioners
have been resolved by amendment or an interpretation by the Board
of Review. Further, rules and regulations consistent with the goals of
the statute have been adopted.
The coming years should see increased drilling and production
activity in Ohio. As the energy shortage worsens, the incentive for
operators to seek out previously marginal sources of production in
Ohio will increase. Furthermore, Ohio industry has already begun,
with the encouragement of the Public Utilities Commission, 254 to
explore for and develop additional reserves of natural gas within the
state, thus introducing a new factor to the industry in this state.
Rising prices for oil and gas and increased drilling activity will
likely place new stresses on the statutory system. As was demon-
strated during the Morrow County boom some twelve years ago,
problems that can be ignored or handled on an ad hoc basis when
drilling activities are at low or moderate levels loom threateningly
as the level of activity increases. Furthermore, the current activity of
Ohio's oil and gas industry and the increased value of the interests
at stake are likely to result in more frequent challenges to actions of
the Division of Oil and Gas. While the statutory scheme is basically
sound and it is likely that the courts will give substantial weight to
the administrative interpretations and practices developed, there are
several steps that should be taken in the near future.
2' On October 31, 1975, in Case No. 73-761-G, In the matter of the Development or the
Supply of Natural Gas Within the State of Ohio, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
liberalized the guidelines under which industrial natural gas users may develop resources within
the state and transport gas by intrastate pipelines to their industrial plants, so that industries
participating in the so called "self-help" plans may be entitled to all of the gas found through
their efforts in addition to their allocations established by the Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio and the public utilities which supply them. Originally, guidelines issued in this same case
on October 18, 1973, had provided that the industrial users would be entitled to fifty percent
of the gas made available to the public utilities pipelines through such schemes. On January
23, 1975, that standard was increased to seventy-five percent. Despite numerous questions of
interpretation and application, the January and October, 1975 amendments have resulted in
the creation of a substantial number of self-help plans under which Ohio industry is partici-
pating in drilling activities within the state.
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First, the statute should be amended to strengthen the Chiefs
authority to act to prevent waste of petroleum. He should be empow-
ered to bar the flaring of natural gas, to establish spacing require-
ments with more flexibility, and to issue rules prohibiting waste after
consultation with the Technical Advisory Council. With burgeoning
need and activity, the importance of these and other statutory amend-
ments suggested herein will become increasingly apparent.
Second, the rules and regulations under which the statute is
administered should be reviewed in view of the increased activity
anticipated. Existing procedures and standards applied by the Divi-
sion should be specifically stated to provide guidance to newcomers
to the industry and to ensure continued compliance by those presently
operating in the state. The amounts of the plugging and restoration
bonds required to be posted should be increased somewhat to main-
tain the force of the lever of forfeiture. Current well spacing require-
ments and saltwater disposal standards should also be reexamined.
A long range plan for the development of additional rules should also
be adopted.
Finally, the problem presented by this state's legacy of orphan
wells should be met by the enactment of House Bill 28 or similar
legislation. It may be that the impetus for legislative action in this
respect will have to come from enforcement by the Division of present
plugging provisions against selected landowners.
In sum, Ohio's oil and gas conservation law goes far toward
insuring the orderly and beneficial development of this state's oil and
gas resources during the acute energy shortages of the latter half of
the 1970's and thereafter, and provides a foundation upon which the
erection of a coherent and substantive legal structure can and must
continue.
